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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF HEALTH CARE
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
Joan H. Krause*
INTRODUCTION
The numbers are staggering: an estimated 10 percent of the
federal health care budget lost to fraud.1 More than $12 billion
improperly paid out by Medicare in fiscal year 2001—a number all
the more striking in that it represents significant progress from
prior years.2 Corporate health care defendants settling fraud
allegations for hundreds of millions of dollars in civil penalties and
*Associate Professor of Law & Co-Director, Health Law & Policy Institute,
University of Houston Law Center; J.D. Stanford Law School, B.A. Yale
University. The author is grateful to David Hyman, Gerry Moohr, Dayna
Matthew, Richard Saver, and Sandra Guerra Thompson for their advice
regarding preparation of this article, and to Gwen Chapman for her research
assistance. This research was supported by a University of Houston Law Center
Summer Research Stipend. Portions of this research were presented to the
American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 26th Annual Health Law Teachers
Conference in June 2002, and to the Houston Bar Association Health Law
Section in May 2002.
1
See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5268 (estimating 1 to 10 percent of the federal budget is lost to fraud).
See, e.g., David A. Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud: An Empirical
Perspective, 22 CATO J. 151, 159 (2002) (arguing that “[a]lthough the figure of
10 percent was an effective political statistic, it has no empirical foundation”).
2
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., NO. A-17-01-02002, IMPROPER FISCAL YEAR 2001 MEDICARE FEE-FORSERVICE PAYMENTS 1 (2002) (acknowledging the error rate represented a
significant reduction from the $23.2 billion in improper payments identified in
1996, the first year such audits were conducted), available at http://oig.hhs.
gov/oas/reports/cms/a0102002.pdf.

55

KRAUSE6.DOC

56

3/8/2004 12:57 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

criminal fines.3 Federal health care fraud recoveries of more than a
billion dollars a year, of which a significant percentage can be used
to fund future enforcement efforts.4 If nothing else, it’s clear there
is money in health care fraud—on both sides of the law.
Federal health care fraud enforcement takes place in an
atmosphere characterized by an increasing number of requirements
placed on the health care providers and professionals who
participate in the federal health care programs, such as Medicare
and Medicaid.5 The federal health care programs are subject to an
enormous number of legal provisions, spanning hundreds of
thousands of pages.6 While some commentators contend that the
3

See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.
and Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay
$875 Million to Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001) (announcing record-setting
settlement), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.
htm. See also Kidney Dialysis Firm Will Pay $496 Million, Plead Guilty to
Defrauding Health Programs, 9 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 127 (Jan.
27, 2000) (announcing prior record-setting settlement). In December 2002, the
government announced the settlement of long-standing litigation against the
former Columbia/HCA for-profit hospital chain, which ultimately will total $1.7
billion dollars. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Press Statement Re: HCA
(Dec. 18, 2002) (announcing settlement), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/opa/pr/2002/December/02_civ_731.htm.
4
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2001
(2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaa01fe19.
htm [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2001]; infra Part I (describing the allocation
of anti-fraud resources).
5
In the federal health care programs, the term “provider” technically refers
to institutional entities, such as hospitals, home health agencies, and nursing
homes. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2003) (defining “provider of services”). Because
they face similar fraud liability, this article will use the term “provider” to refer
more broadly to both individual health care professionals and institutional
entities. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN:
PRACTICES OF BUSINESS CONSULTANTS 1, n.1 (2001) (using term to include,
“providers, suppliers, and practitioners that provide items or services payable in
whole or in part by a Federal health care program”), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/ consultants.pdf.
6
Several years ago, staff at one medical center counted 132,720 pages of
Medicare laws and regulations alone. See Mayo Chronicles Medicare Regs: It’s
132,720 Pages of Red Tape, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 15, 1999, at 64.
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recent proliferation of fraud cases can be blamed on the fact “that
healthcare regulations have just become too complicated to
understand,”7 their arguments have won little sympathy in the halls
of Congress and the annals of public opinion.
At the same time, the legal provisions governing health care
fraud have become similarly complex. At the federal level, health
care fraud is subject to a curious hybrid of ex ante and ex post
enforcement mechanisms.8 Not surprisingly, the powerful ex post
enforcement powers exercised by federal officials—i.e.,
prosecutions resulting in massive criminal and civil liability—have
received the most attention. Given that both the health care
industry and the government share the goal of preventing fraud
before it occurs, however, the focus has shifted in recent years to
informal guidance offering advice to health care providers on how
to structure their activities to fit the law. Some of this advice
comes in the form of opinions responding to individual queries,
while other guidance takes the form of broad policy statements
applicable to the entire industry.9 This guidance does not operate
as pure ex ante regulation because providers are not required to
demonstrate compliance with these criteria before furnishing
services to program beneficiaries.10 While not required for initial
participation in the federal health care programs, however,
compliance may be required in order to continue participation in
the programs once fraud allegations are made.11 Thus, providers

7

Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone Into a Crook, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 21, 2000, at A28.
8
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the
Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1280-81 (1999)
(setting forth the typology of regulatory enforcement schemes).
9
See, e.g., infra Parts III.B.1.a (discussing the advisory opinion process),
III.B.1.b (discussing industry-wide fraud alerts) & III.B.1.c (discussing
compliance guidances).
10
See Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1282-85 (discussing public ex ante
enforcement).
11
See Office of the Inspector Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreements:
General Information (describing the requirements of Corporate Integrity
Agreements, which often are required as part of settlement), at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).
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may have no practical choice but to “voluntarily” comply with the
agency’s position as expressed in such guidance—even if it
includes requirements not found in the underlying statutes or
regulations.12
In the health care context, this guidance currently is provided
in three distinct ways: through the processes of regulation,
information, and litigation.13 Despite the fact that only regulations
promulgated through the notice-and-comment process are legally
binding, anti-fraud efforts increasingly rely on informal
expressions of agency views, as well as the use of public and
private litigation to address ambiguities in substantive regulation.14
While this development offers increased guidance to the industry
as to the scope of permissible activities, it simultaneously raises
troubling concerns about subjecting health care providers to
unofficial—and potentially inconsistent—legal interpretations.
This article analyzes the tripartite health care fraud
enforcement framework. Part I offers a brief introduction to health
care fraud, focusing on recent federal fraud initiatives. Part II
addresses three of the key federal health care fraud laws: the Civil
False Claims Act (FCA), the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Statute, and the so-called “Stark Law” prohibiting physician selfreferrals.15 Part III analyzes the impact of the tripartite regulationinformation-litigation model on health care providers. Part IV
addresses the implications of this model, arguing that the
combination of cumbersome rulemaking procedures, the
proliferation of unofficial guidance, and the growing use of
litigation may create an increasingly untenable situation for the
health care industry.
The article concludes by offering suggestions for how this
model could be refined, focusing on regulatory clarity as a
12

Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1287 (identifying similar “intermediate modes
of enforcement”).
13
“Litigation” might well have been deemed “enforcement” by this
Author—except that it does not rhyme.
14
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
15
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2003) (Civil False Claims Act); 42 U.S.C. §§
1320a-7b(b) (2003) (Anti-Kickback Statute); 42 U.S.C. §1395nn (2003) (Stark
Law).
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necessary precondition for a legitimate fraud enforcement
framework. The principle of regulatory clarity requires the
development of clear rules governing the conduct of health care
providers, supported by substantial penalties for clear violations.
Under the current system, by contrast, fraud is addressed through a
confusing combination of intricately detailed rules and vague
aspirational pronouncements. While this approach offers the
flexibility needed to address new developments in the everchanging health care market, it less clearly serves the goals of
clarity and efficiency—raising the troubling possibility that, in the
eyes of the health care industry, we are willing to sacrifice the
legitimacy of the enforcement process.
I.

HEALTH CARE FRAUD AS A NATIONAL FOCUS

Health care fraud has been a top priority for federal law
enforcement at least since 1994, when former Attorney General
Janet Reno deemed it her “number two priority,” second only to
violent crime.16 Although one might question whether the
Department of Justice (DOJ) had more pressing priorities at the
time, the motivation for the announcement was clear: as the
authors of one treatise note, health care fraud is “where the money
is.”17 The first audit of Medicare fee-for-service payments found
that more than $23 billion had been paid out improperly in fiscal
year 1996 alone.18 Although the numbers have improved each
year, auditors still estimate that $12.1 billion in improper Medicare
payments were made in fiscal year 2001.19
16

See 1994 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/annualreports/ar94/finalag.txt (last visited July 7, 2000).
17
ROBERT FABRIKANT, ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE 1-3 (2002) (paraphrasing statements made by the infamous bank
robber Willie Sutton).
18
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 2 (reviewing
1996 data).
19
Id. Of course, it is not clear that all these improper payments can be
attributed to “fraud” rather than to errors or good faith disagreements. See
Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement: Hearing Before the Task Force on
Health of the House Committee on the Budget, 106th Cong. 117 (2000)
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Consistent with this focus, recent years have seen more funds
appropriated to the federal agencies with jurisdiction over health
care fraud, particularly the DOJ and the Department of Health &
Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG). The
key to this funding was the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).20 Among other things,
HIPAA created a “Fraud and Abuse Control Program” designed to
coordinate federal, state, and local health care fraud enforcement
efforts.21 The centerpiece of this effort is the “Health Care Fraud
and Abuse Control Account,” which funds health care fraud
inspections, investigations, and prosecutions undertaken by the
DOJ and OIG.22 HIPAA set Control Account appropriations at
$104 million in fiscal year 1997, with an increase of up to 15
percent per year through 2003.23 In fiscal year 2001, the Attorney
General and the Secretary of HHS certified $181 million for
appropriation to the Control Account, with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) receiving a separate appropriation of $88
million.24
The DOJ and OIG benefit in both direct and indirect ways from
these appropriations. Directly, this guaranteed source of funding
has permitted the hiring of additional FBI and OIG agents assigned
specifically to health care fraud.25 Indirectly, a form of an
(statement of the OIG, explaining that the “objective is not to determine the
extent of fraud in the Medicare program”), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_hearings&docid=
f:64510.wais.
20
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
21
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2003) (establishing the “Fraud and Abuse
Control Program”).
22
42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(3) (2003) (describing the appropriations to the
account).
23
Id. §§ 1395i(k)(3)(A)-(B) (setting out the maximum amounts available
for appropriation).
24
See ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 4.
25
See, e.g., id. at App. (noting that the FBI’s total allotment was used to
support 445 existing agents and to hire an additional 30 agents); Enforcement:
Terrorism Focus Has Not Diverted Resources from Health Fraud Probes, FBI
Official Says, 6 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 155, 156 (Feb. 20, 2002)
(stating the FBI expected to hire 2,000 more health care agents over the next two
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attenuated “bounty” system exists, whereby some of the money
collected from health care fraud recoveries is available for
appropriation back to the enforcement agencies. HIPAA directed
the bulk of these recoveries to be deposited into the perennially
near-insolvent Medicare Part A Trust Fund.26 A significant portion
of this money, however, can be appropriated back to the Health
Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account to fund future law
enforcement activities.27 As one commentator has noted, “although
this is not a pure bounty system, it is much closer than had
previously been the case.”28
These investments have clearly paid off. The DOJ recently
announced that it recovered more than $980 billion in civil health
care fraud suits and investigations in fiscal year 2002.29 This
represents a slight reduction from fiscal year 2001, when the
government won or negotiated more than $1.7 billion in health
care cases and collected $1.3 billion.30 Rather than signifying a
downturn in enforcement activities, however, this difference is
largely attributable to the fact that awards often are not collected in
the same year in which they are negotiated, and to the ease with

years). In the fall of 2001, there were rumors that many of these agents had been
pulled from health care investigations to staff anti-terrorism initiatives; however,
the FBI later announced that health care fraud staffing remained unchanged. Id.
(quoting FBI Health Care Unit Chief Timothy Delaney).
26
42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(2)(C) (authorizing the transfer of fines, penalties,
and damages obtained in health care fraud cases to the Trust Fund); Sarah
Lueck, Some Premiums for Medicare to Rise 12.4%, WALL ST. J., March 27,
2003, at B2 (reporting on Medicare’s insolvency).
27
42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(3) (explaining the appropriations process for the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account).
28
Roger Feldman, The Regulation of Managed Care Organizations and the
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 574 (2001) (discussing
fraud and abuse in medical care and the inefficient attempts to curb it). See also
Hyman, supra note 1, at 158 (“Although this structure prevents the
government’s fraud control system from operating on a pure bounty system,
there is still considerable suspicion in the provider community on this point.”).
29
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department Recovers Over $1 Billion in
FY 2002 (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/
December/02_civ_720.htm.
30
See ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 4 (listing statistics).
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which a particularly large settlement can skew the statistics for any
given year.31
In addition to pursuing allegations of fraud against individual
providers, the government developed proactive initiatives targeting
particular sectors of the health care industry for intensive scrutiny.
The prototype for such initiatives was “Operation Restore Trust,” a
coordinated federal/state effort in the mid-1990s focusing on fraud
by home health agencies, nursing homes, hospices, and durable
medical equipment suppliers in states with large Medicare
populations.32 Subsequent national and regional initiatives have
included the “72-Hour Window Project” targeting hospital bills for
outpatient services provided within 72 hours of a related inpatient
admission;33 the “Physicians at Teaching Hospitals” (PATH)
investigations targeting academic institutions where attending
physicians have billed for services actually provided by interns and
residents;34 and the “Lab Unbundling Project” investigating
hospital laboratories that may improperly have submitted separate
bills for laboratory tests performed simultaneously.35 In the future,
we are likely to see continued targeting of entire sectors of the
health care industry, with better coordination among the relevant
state and federal authorities.
Similarly, history teaches us that the anti-fraud focus tends to
be cyclical. At the start of the 1990s, the focus was squarely on

31

Id. (“It should be emphasized that some of the judgments, settlements,
and administrative impositions in 2001 will result in collections in future years,
just as some of the collections in 2001 are attributable to actions from prior
years.”).
32
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ORT 12-96-00020, OPERATION
RESTORE TRUST ACTIVITIES (1995) (describing the initiative), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-12-96-00020.pdf.
33
See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-195, MEDICARE:
APPLICATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO HOSPITAL BILLING PRACTICES (July
1998) (reviewing the 72-Hour Window Project).
34
See Pamela H. Bucy, The PATH from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise
of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching
Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3 (2000) (describing the PATH initiative).
35
See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33 (reviewing the Lab
Unbundling Project).
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prescription drug sales and marketing activities.36 Within a few
years, the focus had shifted to fraudulent activities by
laboratories,37 to PATH audits of teaching physicians,38 and to
alleged improprieties by hospices and home health agencies.39 By
the late 1990s, nursing homes increasingly found themselves under
scrutiny for fraud based on alleged quality-of-care deficiencies.40
Most recently, there has been renewed interest in the activities of
prescription drug companies, this time involving pricing practices
in addition to sales and marketing activities.41 Thus, health care
providers can take little comfort in current enforcement priorities:
if one health care sector currently is not on the fraud “radar
screen,” history tells us that it soon may be.
For a variety of reasons, it is not altogether clear what the Bush
Administration will do with regard to health care fraud
enforcement. Attorney General John Ashcroft indicated his support
for some health care fraud initiatives in his confirmation hearings,
albeit perhaps not as strongly as his predecessor.42 And after

36

See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-01-90-00480, PROMOTION OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND GIFTS (1991).
37
See Leon Aussprung, Fraud and Abuse: Federal Civil Health Care
Litigation and Settlement, 19 J. LEG. MED. 1, 8-9 (1998) (describing “Labscam”
cases); Office of the Inspector Gen., Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements For the
Provision of Clinical Laboratory Services (1994), reprinted in Publication of
OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,377 (Dec. 19, 1994)
(warning of fraudulent laboratory practices).
38
See generally Bucy, supra note 34 (describing the PATH initiative).
39
See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert on Physician Liability
For Certifications in the Provision of Medical Equipment and Supplies and
Home Health Services, 64 Fed. Reg. 1813 (Jan. 12, 1999), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/dme.htm; Publication of OIG
Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in Nursing Home Arrangements With
Hospices, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,415 (Apr. 24, 1998).
40
See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing
Home Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,289, 14,295 n.49 (Mar. 16, 2000).
41
See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 1993) (setting forth
the OIG’s general views on drug manufacturer activities).
42
See, e.g., Ashcroft Views Qui Tam Provisions as “Vital” in Fight Against
Fraud, HEALTH L. NEWS, Mar. 2001, at 10.
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September 11, 2001—and the recent corporate fraud scandals—the
DOJ may have more immediate enforcement priorities.43 Clearly it
would be a mistake, however, for health care providers to assume
they can act with impunity because the government’s attention lies
elsewhere.
II. KEY HEALTH CARE FRAUD LAWS
Health care fraud is addressed by a variety of federal and state
laws. Some of these laws, such as the Medicare and Medicaid
Anti-Kickback Statute, are directed at improper activities in the
health care market.44 Others, such as the Civil False Claims Act
(FCA), apply more broadly to entities that transact business with
the federal government.45 Health care fraud also is actionable
under broad criminal statutes such as Mail and Wire Fraud, which
are applicable to criminal conduct regardless of the business
context in which it occurs.46 Of these myriad statutes, the FCA,
Anti-Kickback Statute, and “Stark Law” self-referral prohibitions
are by far the most important to health care providers on a daily
basis. An introduction to these laws is necessary before the
tripartite enforcement model can be understood.
43

The DOJ FY 2004 budget request identified anti-terrorism efforts as the
Department’s first goal; combating corporate fraud was listed second. See Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Requires $23.3 Billion to
Prevent and Combat Terrorism, Drug Crime, Crimes Against Children, and
Corporate Fraud (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2003/February/03_ag_067.htm. The DOJ FY 2002 Performance &
Accountability Report, however, identifies health care fraud as the key focus of
the Department’s second strategic goal, enforcing federal criminal laws. See
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2002 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
Strategic Goal 2.4A (Reduce Fraudulent Practices in the Health Care Industry)
(2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2002/
sg2finalacctperftpt.htm.
44
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2003).
45
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2003).
46
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2003). See, e.g., United States v. Talbott,
590 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978) (affirming convictions for mail fraud and
conspiracy to commit mail fraud based on a fraudulent scheme involving
Medicaid dental benefits).
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A. Civil False Claims Act
The FCA was enacted in 1863 in response to reports of
“rampant fraud” perpetrated on the Union army during the Civil
War.47 While the statute prohibits a variety of fraudulent activities,
the most commonly invoked provision imposes liability on a
defendant when: (1) the defendant presents (or causes to be
presented48) a claim for payment or approval; (2) the claim is false
or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant’s acts are undertaken
“knowingly.”49 This mental state includes not only actual
knowledge, but also deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of
truth or falsity.50 The types of “claims” subject to the Act include
“any request or demand . . . for money or property” if any portion
thereof comes from the federal government.51
47

See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5273 (noting that President Lincoln signed the FCA to combat rampant fraud in
Civil War defense contracts); see generally JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE
CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 1-1 to 1-38 (Supp. 1999) (providing an
historical overview of the Act).
48
“Cause to be presented” liability generally applies where the person
responsible for the falsity does not actually submit the claim, but rather directs
others (who may not know of the falsity) to submit the claim on his behalf. See,
e.g., United States v. Kensington Hospital, 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (alleging that physicians who were suspended from the Medicaid program
“caused” a hospital to submit improper bills on their behalf).
49
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2003). See also BOESE, supra note 47, at 2-9
(noting that violations of § 3729(a)(1) are the most common cause of liability
under the FCA). A fourth potential element, harm to the government, remains
controversial. See Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc:
Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L.
REV. 121, 162-89 (2001) (discussing judicial approaches to fiscal harm under
the FCA). Other relevant FCA provisions include § 3729(a)(2) (prohibiting the
use of false records or statements to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or
paid); § 3729(a)(3) (prohibiting conspiracies “to defraud the government by
getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid”); and § 3729(a)(7)
(prohibiting “reverse false claims,” in which false records or statements are used
“to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government”).
50
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2003).
51
See id. § 3729(c).
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Violators are subject to a civil penalty of $5,500 to $11,000 per
claim, plus three times the amount of damages sustained by the
government.52 Due to the way health care services are billed, it
does not take long for such penalties to reach significant levels.
Most health care providers generate a bill for each occasion of
services rendered to each patient, resulting in the submission of
thousands of small claims a year.53 Fraud tends to occur in small
amounts, such as a few cents or a few dollars per claim.54 While
treble damages are likely to be relatively reasonable in such cases,
the per-claim penalties mount quickly.55 In United States v. Krizek,
for example, a psychiatrist was accused of submitting 8,002
claims, each inflated by approximately $30, for total damages of
$245,000.56 At trial, the government requested penalties of $10,000
per claim, for a total of $81 million.57 Combined with the threat of
exclusion from federal health care programs, the FCA is one of the
major reasons health care providers desire to settle fraud
allegations.58 Thus, this general anti-fraud law has become a key
52

Id. § 3729(a); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (1999) (increasing statutory
penalties by 10 percent).
53
See Bucy, supra note 34, at 38 (“Because of the billing structure for most
health care services (one claim per service, per patient) even a small health care
provider will submit thousands of claims each year.”). See also Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the
Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 259
(describing “a steady stream of small claims, resulting, in the aggregate, in
enormous volumes of claims”).
54
See Bucy, supra note 34, at 38 (“[A]lthough the total amount of loss per
fraud scheme may be large, health care fraud usually is committed in small
dollar increments ($2 per claim form, for example).”).
55
See Jost & Davies, supra note 53, at 260 (“Even if individually quite
small . . . astronomical sums are quickly reached.”).
56
111 F.3d 934, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
57
Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld FCA liability on a theory of
“reckless disregard,” but remanded for a variety of evidentiary issues pertaining
to the calculation of damages and penalties. Id. at 943. The appeals in the case
continued through 1999, at which time the D.C. Circuit noted, “It is time for the
parties to stop refighting battles long-ago lost and for the district court to bring
this prosecution to an expeditious close.” United States v. Krizek, 192 F.3d
1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
58
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2003) (setting forth grounds for exclusion from
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component of the government’s war against health care fraud.
One reason the FCA has been so successful is the law’s qui tam
provisions, which permit private “relators” who sue on the
government’s behalf to retain 15 to 30 percent of the proceeds of
the suit—creating a powerful incentive for private parties to police
their neighbors in the health care market.59 Since amendments in
1986 modernized the Act and made it more lucrative to pursue qui
tam actions, the number of health care-related FCA suits has
grown exponentially.60 By 1998, nearly two-thirds of the qui tam
suits filed concerned the federal health care programs, compared to
only 12 percent in 1987.61 This powerful civil law can thus be
invoked not only by federal prosecutors, but also by competitors,
employees, and even patients and their families—making the FCA
a significant threat to health care providers who receive payment
from federal health care programs.
Traditionally, health care FCA cases have involved
misrepresentation of the facts surrounding the services for which
payment is requested, such as the submission of claims for services
that were never rendered.62 Still unanswered is the question of
whether the FCA can be used as a vehicle for suits alleging
violations of other federal health care program requirements.
Recently, prosecutors and qui tam relators have invoked the law in
situations where health care services were in fact delivered to
patients, but where the claimants may have violated underlying
legal requirements (such as the federal anti-referral laws) in
federal health care programs); Krause, supra note 49, at 202-12 (discussing FCA
settlements). See also Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care
Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363 (2002)
[hereinafter Krause, “Promises to Keep”].
59
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b), (d) (2003) (noting that a private person who
brings a civil action may potentially receive 15 to 30 percent of the proceeds,
depending on factors such as whether the government joins in the suit).
60
See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100
Stat. 3153 (1986).
61
See Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson, FCA Statistics, at
http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/fcastats.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
62
See, e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1975)
(imposing liability on a physician who billed Medicare for physical therapy
services that had not been performed).
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furnishing the care.63 Although few court opinions address the
merits of such suits, these arguments have been quite successful at
generating settlements.64
B. Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute
The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute is the major
federal law affecting financial relationships within the health care
market.65 The statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting, or
receiving any “remuneration” to induce someone to refer patients
to any facility, or to purchase, lease, or order any item or service,
for which payment may be made by a federal health care
program.66 Unlike the FCA, the Anti-Kickback Statute is a
criminal law specifically targeting improper activities involving
health care items and services.67 This broadly-drawn statute
governs a wide range of financial relationships, including those
among health care providers, between health care providers and
their patients, and between health care providers and the
manufacturers/suppliers from whom they purchase health care
products. At core, the statute seeks to limit the influence of
financial incentives over health care decisions, demanding that
such decisions be made solely on the basis of which products and
services will best serve the interests of the patient, rather than the
provider.68
63

See Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1391-1406
(discussing health care FCA cases).
64
See id. at 1404; infra Part III.C.2.a.
65
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2003).
66
Id.
67
Id. § 1320a-7(b) (specifying criminal penalties).
68
See, e.g., Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks,
Courtesies, or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of the Medicare Antikickback
Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device
Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 282 (1999) (“The main purpose of
the antikickback law may be summarized most succinctly as preventing
inappropriate financial considerations from influencing the amount, type, cost,
or selection of the provider of medical care received by a federal health care
program beneficiary.”); Medicare and Medicare Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 54 Fed. Reg. 3,088, 3,089 (proposed Jan. 23,
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More specifically, the statute prohibits: (1) the knowing and
willful; (2) offer or payment (or solicitation or receipt); (3) of any
form of remuneration; (4) to induce someone to refer patients or to
purchase, order, or recommend; (5) any item or service that may be
paid for under a federal health care program.69 Several aspects of
this definition require elaboration. First, because the statute
prohibits both the offer/payment and the solicitation/receipt of
remuneration, both parties to an improper transaction are subject to
prosecution (provided, of course, they have the requisite intent).
Second, the definition of “remuneration” is quite broad,
incorporating payment made “directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind.”70 As such, the prohibition extends
beyond simple kickbacks and bribes to reach not only the exchange
of money, but anything of value or any type of benefit offered to
the referring party, including relieving that party of a financial
burden she would otherwise have to bear.71
Third, the concept of intent is key to understanding the statute.
Unfortunately, intent has been used to refer to two similar yet
distinct concepts in Anti-Kickback jurisprudence. The first is the
general motivation behind the questionable financial relationship—
whether it was designed to induce the referral of patients or the
purchase of items or services. In this respect, the law has been
interpreted quite broadly to encompass situations in which even
one purpose of the remuneration—rather than the sole or primary
purpose—is to induce prohibited referrals.72 Recognizing that few
1989) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (“[I]t is necessary for the fiscal
integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid programs to assure that physicians
exercise sound, objective medical judgment when controlling admittance to this
market.”).
69
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
70
Id. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2).
71
See, e.g., Medicare and Medicare Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 3,090 (describing abusive rental schemes).
72
See, e.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir.
2000) (“[A] person who offers or pays remuneration to another person violates
the Act so long as one purpose of the offer or payment is to induce Medicare or
Medicaid patient referrals.”); United States v. Greber, 760 F.3d 68, 72 (3d Cir.
1985) (“If the payments were intended to induce the physician to use
[defendant’s] services, the statute was violated, even if the payments were also
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transactions are entered into without at least some contemplation of
business advantage, however, the Tenth Circuit recently
acknowledged that “a hospital or individual may lawfully enter
into a business relationship with a doctor and even hope for or
expect referrals from the doctor, as long as the hospital is
motivated to enter into the relationship for legal reasons entirely
distinct from its collateral hope for referrals.”73 Whether it will be
feasible to parse the parties’ motivations in such a detailed manner
remains to be seen.
The second meaning of intent tracks the traditional criminal
law definition of mens rea: did the parties make or receive the
improper payments with the requisite “knowing and willful” state
of mind?74 In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit held
that a violation of the statute could not be found unless the
defendant both knew that the law prohibited giving or receiving
remuneration in return for referrals and acted with the specific
intent to violate the statute.75 Although this narrow interpretation
was heartening to the health care industry, it remains confined to
those parties falling within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Courts
in other circuits have declined to adopt such a stringent intent
standard, finding that the Anti-Kickback Statute is not the sort of
“highly technical . . . regulation that poses a danger of ensnaring
persons engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” for which

intended to compensate for professional services.”).
73
McClatchey, 217 F.3d at 834. The court, however, gave no indication of
how to separate the parties’ collateral hopes and expectations from their
“purpose” in such situations. See also United States v. Bay State Ambulance &
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) (approving a jury
instruction that prohibited conviction if the improper purpose was “incidental”
or “minor”).
74
Mens rea is defined as “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure
a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime;
criminal intent or recklessness.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1999 (7th ed.
1999).
75
51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on Ratzlaf v. United States,
510 U.S. 135 (1994), in which the Supreme Court addressed willfulness in the
context of the prohibition against structuring financial transactions to avoid
currency reporting requirements, 31 U.S.C. § 5322).
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specific intent is appropriate.76 At present, then, the applicable
mens rea standard will vary depending on the jurisdiction in which
the action is brought.
Finally, it is important to remember that the statute applies to
referrals made in connection with beneficiaries of any of the
federal health care programs.77 For many years the prohibition
applied only to Medicare and Medicaid patients, leaving an
apparent loophole for improper behavior in other federally-funded
programs.78 As of January 1, 1997, however, the prohibition is
applicable to all federal health care programs other than the
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).79 While a
case involving significant monetary damage to the federal health
care programs may present a particularly attractive target for
federal prosecutors, no actual payment by the government is
required; the mere potential for increased costs will suffice.80
Penalties for violating the statute are severe, consisting of both
criminal and civil/administrative sanctions: violation of the statute
is a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison and/or a fine of

76

United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (paraphrasing
Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998)). See also United States v.
Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring proof that the defendant “knew that
his conduct was wrongful, rather than proof that he knew it violated a known
legal duty”). For a general discussion of these issues, see Timothy J. Aspinwall,
The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of Intent: The Case for a Rule of Reason
Analysis, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155 (2000); Sharon L. Davies, The
Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48
DUKE L.J. 341 (1998).
77
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7-b(b) (2003).
78
See Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 204, 110 Stat. 1936, 1999 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2003)).
79
Id. The FEHBP, the health insurance program for federal employees, is
likely excluded for two reasons: (1) it is an employment benefit program, rather
than a social welfare or entitlement program; and (2) it is administered by the
Office of Personnel Management, rather than by HHS. See 5 C.F.R. § 890
(2003).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980)
(“The potential for increased costs if such . . . agreements become an established
and accepted method of business is clearly an evil with which the court was
concerned and one Congress sought to avoid in enacting [the statute].”).
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up to $25,000.81 Upon conviction, the defendant is subject to
exclusion from all federal health care programs, a potentially fatal
blow for entities that derive substantial revenues from such
business.82 In lieu of a criminal prosecution, the OIG may also
seek “permissive” exclusion of the provider.83 Prior to being
excluded, the provider will receive notice and an opportunity to
request a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).84
Although the provider has the right to an attorney, to discovery,
and to present evidence on its behalf, the administrative hearing is
not identical to a trial and the ALJ is not bound by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.85 Thus, one of the most severe penalties
available for violating the statute—exclusion from all federal
health care programs—can be imposed without a full-fledged civil
or criminal proceeding.
Prior to the late 1990s, the OIG had indicated that it would not
seek to exclude entities who were not paid directly by the federal
health care programs, such as drug manufacturers who sell their
products to physicians and pharmacists (who may in turn submit
claims for reimbursement).86 In 1998, however, the OIG reversed
course and issued regulations permitting the exclusion of entities
that “indirectly furnish” items and services to federal health care
program beneficiaries.87 Because of the potential for exclusion—as
81

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
The OIG must exclude individuals and entities convicted of a felony
related to health care fraud, and may exclude them for misdemeanor
convictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).
83
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (permitting the exclusion of “[a]ny individual
or entity that the Secretary determines has committed an act which is described
in section . . . 1128B . . .”); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.951 (2003) (permitting exclusion
in limited circumstances).
84
42 C.F.R. § 1001 (2003).
85
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 1005.3 (2003) (rights of parties), 1005.17 (evidence), &
1005.21 (appeals).
86
See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Amendments to OIG
Exclusion and CMP Authorities Resulting from Public Law 100-93, 57 Fed.
Reg. 3298, 3300 (Jan. 29, 1992) (declining to invoke the exclusion authority
against manufacturers).
87
See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion
Authorities Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676 (Sept. 2,
82
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well as civil and criminal sanctions—it is fair to say that the AntiKickback Statute now poses a significantly stronger threat to drug
manufacturers than in the past.
Violations of the statute are also punishable by civil and
administrative monetary sanctions.88 The government has the
authority to impose a civil monetary penalty (CMP) for violation
of the statute in the amount of $50,000 for each violation, plus not
more than three times the remuneration involved.89 In theory, this
provision has the potential to dwarf even the FCA provisions,
under which penalties presently are limited to $11,000 per
violation.90 In reality, however, this relatively new CMP has not
often been invoked.
As noted above, some courts have now permitted qui tam
actions under the FCA based on allegations that the defendant
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute.91 In United States ex rel.
Pogue v. American Healthcorp. Inc., for example, a relator alleged
that the defendant hospitals and physicians had submitted claims
for services furnished pursuant to referrals that violated the
Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law.92
The relator argued that because compliance with the anti-referral
laws was a prerequisite for participation in Medicare and
Medicaid, any claims submitted in violation of these provisions
were, by definition, false and fraudulent.93 In other words, the
relator posited that the defendants were liable because the
government would not have paid them for their services had it

1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.10 (2003)). The OIG characterized its
about-face as a “clarification,” rather than a change in policy. Id.
88
42 U.S.C. § 1128A(a)(7) (2003) (imposing civil penalty on a person who
“commits an act described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1128B(b)”).
89
Id.
90
28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (2003).
91
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
92
914 F. Supp. 1507, 1508 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (denying defendants’
motion to dismiss).
93
See id. at 1509. The district court initially rejected the relator’s theory,
see United States ex. rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., No. 3-94-0515,
1995 WL 626514 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1995), but later reconsidered. See
Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1507 (granting motion to reconsider).
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known of the referrals.94 While this proposition has not been
accepted by all jurisdictions,95 such cases raise troubling concerns
for providers—especially to the extent they essentially create a
private right of action for kickbacks.
The language of the Anti-Kickback Statute is very broad, as
have been judicial interpretations of the law. As commentators
have noted, “[t]he statute has been held applicable to a wide
variety of financial relationships that are quite different from an
obvious kickback for a patient referral or a bribe to recommend the
purchase of specific products or services.”96 Read literally, the
statute prohibits the transfer of any amount of remuneration to a
potential referral source—including a hospital or drug company
offering physicians free pens, paper, or coffee and donuts.
Intuitively, it may appear that such minor gifts are unlikely to
influence physician referral practices, and are not worth the time
and energy required for a successful prosecution.97 The statute
contains no dollar threshold, though, and the few cases to

94

914 F. Supp. at 1509.
See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting per se approach and limiting
FCA’s application to situations in which the claimant falsely certifies
compliance with a condition that is a prerequisite for payment).
96
Bulleit & Krause, supra note 68, at 283.
97
But see Mary-Margaret Chren et al., Doctors, Drug Companies, and
Gifts, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3448, 3449 (1989) (“Even mundane things . . . can
have significance when they are gifts—a book is not simply a book if it is used
to engender a response.”); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 376 (2000)
(concluding that there is “an independent association between benefiting from
sponsored meals and formulary additional requests” for drugs). Although
prosecutors might appear to be unlikely to pursue such small cases, the OIG
repeatedly has warned the industry about offering even minimal gifts to referral
sources. Cf. Notice, Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering
Gifts and Other Inducements to Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,855 (Aug. 30,
2002),
available
at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
alertsandbulletins/SABGiftsand Inducements.pdf (permitting providers to offer
beneficiaries “inexpensive gifts” under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5), defined as
gifts having no more than $10 individual retail value and no more than $50
annually per patient).
95
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recognize a de minimis exception have set the bar extremely low.98
Thus, while the statute is very good at prohibiting all financial ties
that might impermissibly influence referral decisions, it is not very
good at distinguishing truly problematic activities from ones that
are neutral—or perhaps even beneficial for the industry.99
Fortunately, Congress has “recognized that the Anti-Kickback
Statute’s broad language ha[s] the potential for creating confusion
in the health care industry regarding the legality of many
commonplace business arrangements.”100 The statute contains
explicit exceptions for a few categories of activities, including
discounts and payment to employees.101 Moreover, Congress
directed the Secretary of HHS to issue regulations exempting
additional practices from the scope of the law.102 These
regulations—known as the “safe harbors”—identify “transactions
that are deemed to pose little or no threat of abuse or to be
otherwise desirable or legitimate arrangements,” and hence do not
violate the statute.103 The initial safe harbors were published in
1991; a second set of exceptions followed in 1992, with significant

98

See, e.g., Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, Dec. No. 1275 (HHS
Dept. App. Bd., App. Div., 1991), reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH), 1992-1 Transfer Binder, ¶ 39,566 at 27,763 n.34 (noting that “de
minimis or very remote forms of remuneration, such as drug samples or
recruitment lunches, may not be subject to prosecution . . . If the remuneration
offered is unlikely to affect physician referral decisions, it is probably not
intended to induce referrals” under the statute).
99
See Aspinwall, supra note 76, at 182-84 (discussing the need for a rule of
reason” analysis to prevent the Anti-Kickback Statute from restricting the
development of innovative cost-effective health care arrangements).
100
Robert N. Rabecs, Kickbacks as False Claims: The Use of the Civil
False Claims Act to Prosecute Violations of the Federal Health Care Program’s
Anti-Kickback Statute, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT. C.L. 1, 7 (2001).
101
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2003) (exempting practices such as
discounts, employment compensation, and group purchasing organizations from
the scope of the prohibition).
102
See Medicare & Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697-98 (1998).
103
John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson is Wrong: Misuse of
the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26
(1999); see generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003) (safe harbor regulations).
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amendments finalized in 1999.104 Pursuant to HIPAA, the OIG is
required to solicit recommendations from the public for adding or
revising the safe harbors on an annual basis.105
The safe harbors address a variety of common business
transactions, such as personal services contracts and the lease of
office space and equipment, as well as such health-care-specific
activities as the sale of a medical practice and subsidization of
malpractice insurance.106 As the name suggests, “parties who
structure their business arrangements to satisfy all the criteria of an
applicable safe harbor are sheltered from liability under the AntiKickback Statute.”107 In general, the safe harbor requirements are
very narrow and do not provide protection for many real-life
business arrangements.108 Because a statutory violation can be
proven only if there is sufficient evidence of intent, however,
arrangements that do not fall within a safe harbor are not
necessarily illegal.109
In determining whether to prosecute under the statute, the OIG
has said that it will look to a variety of factors, including: (a) the
104

See Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory
Exception to the Anti-Kickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed.
Reg. 63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud
and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment
of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed.
Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud
and Abuse; Safe Harbors for Protecting Health Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,723 (Nov.
5, 1992); Medicare & State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (July 29, 1991).
105
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a).
106
See generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003) (listing the safe harbor
provisions).
107
Rabecs, supra note 100, at 7.
108
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. While each safe harbor has specific criteria,
common requirements include: (1) a signed written agreement; (2) a minimum
one-year term; (3) payment consistent with “fair market value”; and (4)
compensation set in advance and not dependent on the volume/value of referrals
or other business between the parties. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)
(describing the criteria for personal services and management contracts).
109
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,954
(stating that the legality of an arrangement will depend upon a fact-specific
analysis).
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potential for increased charges or costs to payers, especially the
government; (b) the potential encouragement of overutilization
(i.e., the ordering or performance of health care services beyond
those which are medically necessary); (c) the potential for adverse
effects on competition; and (d) the intent of the parties.110 As
discussed below, recent years have seen a proliferation of AntiKickback guidance in addition to the safe harbors, including
Advisory Opinions, Special Fraud Alerts, and Special Advisory
Bulletins.111
C. Limitations on Physician Self-Referrals (“Stark Law”)
Originally introduced by Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark
as the “Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989,” the so-called
“Stark Law” was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989.112 The Stark Law is a civil statute
designed to prohibit the referral of Medicare and Medicaid patients
to health care providers with whom the referring physician has a
financial relationship.113 The statute was enacted in response to
studies suggesting an unexplained increase in the utilization of
Medicare laboratory services when the referring physician had a
financial interest in the laboratory to which the patients were
referred.114
The original legislation, which has come to be known as “Stark
I,” took effect on January 1, 1992, and applied to the referral of
Medicare patients for clinical laboratory services.115 Several years
later, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
110

See id. at 35,954, 35,956.
See infra Part III.B.
112
101 Pub. L. No. 239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn (2003).
113
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2003).
114
See Medicare Program: Physician Ownership of, and Referrals to,
Health Care Entities that Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services, 57 Fed. Reg.
8,588, 8,589 (proposed May 11, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411)
(describing studies).
115
See Pub. L. No. 239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2106 (specifying the original
prohibition).
111
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(OBRA ‘93), Congress extended the prohibition to Medicaid
patients and expanded it to include a list of ten additional
“designated health services”—including inpatient and outpatient
hospital services, outpatient prescription drugs, physical and
occupational therapy, and home health servicesas of December
31, 1994.116
The Stark Law takes a different approach than the AntiKickback Statute, which looks for abuses on a case-by-case
basis.117 Instead, Stark prohibits all patient referrals if a relevant
financial relationship exists, subject to numerous narrowly drawn
exceptions.118 In its most basic form, the law prohibits referrals of
patients for designated health services if the referring physician (or
an immediate family member) has a “financial relationship” with
the entity providing the services—a category that includes both
ownership/investment and compensation relationships.119 An entity
that provides such designated health services may not bill anyone
for services furnished as a result of a prohibited referral.120 To the
extent it contains no intent requirement, the law is in essence a
strict liability prohibition.
The relevant definitions under the statute are correspondingly
broad.121 Most notably, the compensation arrangements that trigger
the prohibition include any arrangement involving any
remuneration—directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash
and in kind—between the physician (or an immediate family
member) and the health care entity.122 Ownership and investment
interests include those held in equity, debt, or by any other
means.123 Prohibited referrals include (a) the request or
116

See Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13562 & 13624, 107 Stat. 31 (1993). The
other designated health services are radiology, radiation therapy, durable
medical equipment, parenteral and enteral nutrients, and prosthetics/orthotics. 42
U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6).
117
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2003).
118
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(a)-(e).
119
Id. § 1395nn(a) (general prohibition).
120
Id.
121
Id. § 1395nn(h).
122
Id. § 1395nn(h)(1).
123
Id. § 1395nn(a)(1). To further complicate things, HHS interprets these
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establishment by a physician of a plan of care that includes the
provision of designated health services, and (b) the request by a
physician for an item or service for which payment may be made
under Medicare Part B, including a request for consultation with
another physician as well as any test or procedure ordered by, or
performed by or under the supervision of, the consulting
physician.124
Unlike the Anti-Kickback Statute, the Stark Law is not a
criminal statute and is not punishable by imprisonment. From the
perspective of health care providers, however, the consequences
may be nearly as dire. The statute prohibits payment for a
designated health service furnished pursuant to a prohibited
referral: claims for such services will be denied, and any payments
erroneously received must be refunded.125 Moreover, any person
who knowingly submits or causes a bill to be submitted for
prohibited services is subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to
$15,000 for each such service.126 If those provisions are not
onerous enough, violation of Stark also constitutes grounds for
exclusion from the federal health care programs—the equivalent of
a financial “death penalty” for many health care providers.127
The harshness of the Stark prohibition is mitigated, to a certain
extent, by numerous statutory exceptions.128 Yet here, too, the law
is stricter than the Anti-Kickback Statute: because there is no intent
requirement, the law is violated unless all the criteria for an

definitions to apply to “indirect” as well as “direct” financial relationships. See
42 C.F.R. § 411.354 (2003).
124
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(5).
125
Id. § 1395nn(g)(1)-(2).
126
Id. §§ 1395nn(g)(3) (per-service penalty) & (g)(4) (imposing a penalty
of up to $100,000 for an “arrangement or scheme” designed to circumvent the
prohibition).
127
Id. § 1395nn(g)(3)-(4) (referencing exclusion provisions in 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7). For a discussion of the ways in which such civil actions can be
considered to have a “punitive” effect, see generally, Kenneth Mann, Punitive
Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE
L.J. 1795 (1992).
128
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)-(e).
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exception are met.129 The exceptions are divided into three
categories: (1) general exceptions, which apply to both ownership
and compensation arrangements; (2) exceptions relating only to
ownership or investment interests; and (3) exceptions relating to
compensation arrangements.130 General exceptions include such
things as ancillary services provided in a physician’s office (such
as an in-office laboratory) or services provided by another
physician in the referring physician’s group practice.131 Exceptions
applicable to ownership/investment interests include the types of
investments that might be made by a layperson, such as the
purchase of publicly traded securities or mutual funds.132 Not
surprisingly, the exceptions applicable to compensation
arrangements include a number of common business practices,
many of which have corresponding Anti-Kickback safe harbors
(such as the rental of office space or equipment, bona fide
employment, and personal services arrangements).133
As described below, a great deal of uncertainty continues to
surround the status of the Stark II regulations, which have yet to be
completed.134 Moreover, issues similar to those under the AntiKickback Statute have arisen regarding the propriety of using
alleged Stark Law violations as the basis for suits under the
FCA.135 In fact, the majority of alleged Stark Law violations thus
129

Id.
Id. Additional exceptions were added by the regulations. See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 411.355, 411.357 (2003).
131
Id. § 1395nn(b)(1)-(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.355. For both exceptions, the
physician group must meet the complicated definition of a “group practice.” Id.
§ 1395nn(h)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 411.352.
132
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c); 42 C.F.R. § 411.356.
133
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357 (adding new exceptions).
134
“Phase I” of the regulations was published in January 2001 and took
effect (with minor exceptions) in January 2002. As of December 2003, however,
CMS had yet to publish “Phase II” of the regulations, which will address
additional exceptions, sanctions, and reporting requirements. See Medicare
Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have
Financial Relationships, 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 4, 2001) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pts. 411 & 424 (2003)). See also infra Part II.A.
135
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 900-01 (5th Cir.
130
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far have been brought via qui tam suits, rather than as direct
enforcement of the statute by HHS.136
III. CURRENT THEMES IN FRAUD AND ABUSE
With that brief overview, this article now turns to a discussion
of current federal efforts to eliminate health care fraud and abuse.
Recent scholarship provides a variety of perspectives on these
efforts. Some commentators decry the expanded use of the fraud
laws, arguing that recent initiatives are unfair and ultimately will
work to the detriment of both providers and patients.137 While
acknowledging that minor adjustments may be necessary, other
commentators stress that “fraud and abuse is morally wrong and
fiscally harmful,” and praise recent enforcement innovations.138
The debate—in part practical, in part theoretical—shows few signs
of abating.139
1997) (addressing an FCA suit based on alleged Stark and Anti-Kickback
violations).
136
See, e.g., Robert Salcido, The Government Unleashes the Stark Law to
Enforce the False Claims Act: The Implications of the Government’s Theory for
the Future of False Claims Act Enforcement, 13 No. 5 HEALTH LAW, Aug.
2001, at 1 (describing cases); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Settlements with South Dakota Hospital and Doctors for $6,525,000,
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/December002_civ_739. htm (Dec. 20,
2002) (announcing settlement of Stark-based qui tam suit against South Dakota
hospital).
137
See, e.g., Boese & McLain, supra note 103, at 55 (arguing that the
Thompson decision “perpetuated a regime in which health care providers are
subjected to a degree of uncertainty that undermines the bedrock principles of
the rule of law”); Krause, supra note 49, at 212 (arguing that widespread
provider perception that the laws are being used unfairly may jeopardize the
legitimacy of the anti-fraud agenda); Dayna Bowen Matthew, An Economic
Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims Act Cases on Access to Healthcare
for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and Inner-City Poor, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 439,
467 (2001) (arguing that false certification cases are “flawed tools . . . likely to
have a disproportionately negative impact on the availability of healthcare to the
poor”).
138
Jost & Davies, supra note 53, at 318 (arguing that only “targeted
corrections” are needed).
139
See Hyman, supra note 1, at 174 (noting that assessment of whether
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Rather than adopting one of these viewpoints, the tripartite
conceptual model addressed here focuses instead on the
mechanisms by which government officials communicate with the
provider community about permissible behaviors. Currently, such
communications take the form of regulation, information, and
litigation. Despite the fact that only properly promulgated
regulations are legally binding, health care fraud efforts
increasingly have followed the latter two approaches. On the
positive side, this development offers increased guidance to health
care providers as to the scope of their permissible business
activities. At the same time, however, it raises the possibility that
providers may be subjected not only to additional—but perhaps
also to inconsistent—legal interpretations from these varied
sources.
A. Regulation
By regulation, I mean the development of official, binding
guidance through traditional notice-and-comment procedures in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).140 The
APA requires an agency such as HHS to provide notice and an
opportunity for public comment regarding all proposed “rule
makings.”141 The Social Security Act reiterates this requirement
for the Medicare program, providing that “[n]o rule, requirement,
or other statement of policy . . . that establishes or changes a
substantive legal standard governing the scope of benefits [or] the
payment for services shall take effect unless” properly
promulgated by the Secretary of HHS.142
Notice-and-comment rulemaking has a long history in the
health care context, particularly under the Anti-Kickback Statute.
The Statute itself contains several exceptions, and Congress
current efforts “mark[] a step in the right direction” depends on a number of
“preexisting assumptions regarding the frequency and severity of the problem”).
140
5 U.S.C. § 551 (2003).
141
Id. § 553. A “rule” is defined as “the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” Id. § 551(4).
142
42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2003).
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directed the Secretary of HHS to develop additional “safe harbor”
regulations exempting additional practices from the scope of the
law.143 Although the basic contours of the safe harbors were
established by the early 1990s, notice-and-comment rulemaking
continues to play a key role in their development. As the OIG
recently stated, “Congress intended the safe harbor regulations to
be evolving rules that would be updated periodically to reflect
changing business practices and technologies in the health care
industry.”144
For example, HIPAA explicitly required HHS to engage in a
negotiated rulemaking process to develop a new exception for risksharing arrangements, such as those commonly found in managed
care.145 HIPAA similarly invoked the traditional APA process by
requiring the Secretary of HHS to publish an annual notice
soliciting proposals for new and revised safe harbors, with the
resulting amendments to be made through notice-and-comment
procedures.146 Most recently, this procedure was used to develop a
new safe harbor exempting health care facilities from liability for
restocking certain ambulance supplies used in transporting
143

See 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2003) (exempting practices such as
discounts, employment compensation, and group purchasing organizations from
the scope of the prohibition); Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program
Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 697-98 (requiring
development of safe harbors); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (listing current safe harbor
provisions).
144
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe
Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute for Waiver of Beneficiary Coinsurance
and Deductible Amounts, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,202, 60,203 (proposed Sept. 25,
2002) (to be codified 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
145
See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 216, 110 Stat. 1936, 2007-8 (1996). The
resulting safe harbors were published in November 1999, along with revisions to
a number of the existing regulations. See Medicare and State Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory Exception to the Anti-Kickback Statute
for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at
42 C.F.R. § 100.952(t) & (u) (2003)) (finalizing risk sharing safe harbors);
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the
Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor
Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19,
1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2003)) (amending safe harbors).
146
See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 205, 110 Stat. 1936, 2000-01 (1996).
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patients.147
For a long time, the traditional notice-and-comment process
was virtually the only way for health care providers to obtain
guidance from the government on how to interpret the fraud laws.
As a result, attorneys pored over the lengthy preamble to each
Federal Register notice, trying to glean some nugget of regulatory
intent to help decipher the complicated language of the law and
regulations. The government was not blind to this phenomenon,
and the agencies artfully used the notices to convey information
that was not explicitly contained in the regulations themselves—
such as the factors that would be taken into account in determining
whether to pursue a particular Anti-Kickback allegation.148
Over time, however, it became abundantly clear that the
traditional regulatory process was too cumbersome to respond to
the practical realities of the complex health care market. This
observation is by no means limited to health care; the
administrative law literature is replete with examples of the
“ossification” of the formal rulemaking process.149 In the health
care fraud context, however, this phenomenon denies providers the
immediate guidance they need to determine the legality of many

147

Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
Ambulance Replenishing Safe Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 66 Fed.
Reg. 62,979 (Dec. 4, 2001), codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(v) (2003).
148
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,954 (July 29, 1991)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2003)) (listing factors); Lewis Morris & Gary
W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government’s Stick and Carrot Approach to
Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 352 (1999) (reiterating the
aspects of an Anti-Kickback inquiry).
149
See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1997) (describing the
disadvantages of the traditional agency rulemaking process); Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE
L. J. 1385 (1992) (describing how rulemaking “has become increasingly rigid
and burdensome”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking
Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997) (defining ossification as “the
inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs because of analytic hurdles that
agencies must clear in order to adopt new rules”).
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commonplace business transactions. In particular, the time lag
between a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the issuance of a
Final Rule raises the possibility that industry practice—and the law
itself—may change significantly in the interim. As but one
example, the OIG proposed several new Anti-Kickback safe
harbors in 1993, and proposed to amend a number of the existing
safe harbors in 1994.150 The amendments were not finalized,
however, until after the Clinton Health Plan debates had resulted in
the enactment of HIPAA—which created a new statutory
exception and required the development of additional safe harbors
concerning risk sharing arrangements.151
Similarly, the dynamic nature of the health care market and the
innovative ways in which health care providers seek to adjust to
changing market conditions create a situation in which the official
regulations always seem to be one step behind industry practice.
Due to the pace of health care innovation—as well as the existence
of a few entrepreneurial providers who seek to “game” the
increasingly complex system—the financial arrangements
regarding health care (and the attendant forms of fraud) essentially
are moving targets.152 The OIG has acknowledged this, noting,

150

See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Additional Safe Harbor
Provisions Under the OIG Anti-Kickback Statute, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008
(proposed Sept. 21, 1993) (to be codified at 42. C.F.R. § 1001.952) (proposing
seven additional safe harbors); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud
and Abuse; Clarification of the OIG Safe Harbor Anti-Kickback Provisions, 59
Fed. Reg. 37,202 (proposed July 21, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
1001.952) (proposing revisions to safe harbors).
151
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191, § 204, 110 Stat. 1936. Final revisions were not published until November
1999. See Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory Exception
to the Anti-Kickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg.
63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003)); Medicare and
State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial OIG
Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions
Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified
at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003)).
152
“Gaming the system” refers to “an artificial restructuring of
employment or social relationships to maximize individual benefits.” Edward G.
Grossman, Comparing the Options for Universal Coverage, HEALTH AFF.,
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“Congress intended the safe harbor regulations to be evolving rules
to reflect changing business practices and technologies in the
health care industry.”153 Although health care fraud regulations are
designed to provide flexibility, by necessity they are based on a
loose snapshot of industry practice at a single point in time.
Enshrining such practices in law not only risks the creation of
regulations that are outdated from the moment of creation, but also
raises the possibility of freezing the industry at a sub-optimal point
in time. As a result, according to Professor James Blumstein,
current health care fraud enforcement is analogous to a
“speakeasy,” where “conduct that is illegal is rampant and
countenanced by law enforcement officials because the law is so
out of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the
marketplace.”154
Perhaps no topic illustrates the perils of health care fraud
regulation as much as the ongoing saga of the Stark Law. As
described above, the current law is derived from two different
pieces of legislation: (1) an initial prohibition on physician selfreferrals of Medicare patients for clinical laboratory services,
which took effect on January 1, 1992; and (2) the OBRA ‘93
expansion covering additional categories of designated health
services, which took effect as of December 31, 1994.155 By
December 2003, however, the Stark II regulations had yet to be
completed.
The initial regulations implementing the Stark I prohibitions

Spring (II) 1994, at 86. In the health care context, for example, “physicians may
attempt to game the system so as to evade cost control measures” that might
reduce their revenue. Arti K. Rai, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: A Tale of
Behavior Induced by Payment Structure, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 579 (2001).
153
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe
Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute for Waiver of Beneficiary Coinsurance
and Deductible Amounts, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,202, 60,203 (proposed Sept. 25,
2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952).
154
James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving
Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J. L. &
MED. 205, 218 (1996).
155
See supra Part II.C.
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were proposed in the spring of 1992.156 The proposal resulted in
the submission of almost three hundred comments to the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA, now renamed the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)).157 As a result, the
final rule was not published until August of 1995—three years
after the original law went into effect, and eight months after the
expanded Stark II provisions had become effective.158 While
indicating its intention to publish a separate notice of proposed
rulemaking for Stark II, HCFA stated:
[W]e believe that a majority of our interpretations in this
final rule with comment will apply to the other designated
health services. Until we publish a rule covering the
designated health services, we intend to rely on our
language and interpretation in this final rule when
reviewing referrals for the designated health services in
appropriate cases.159
In the interim, health care lawyers were forced to improvise,
offering their best guesses as to the meaning of the Stark II
provisions based on the broad statutory language and extrapolating
from analogous, but not identical, Stark I regulations.
And a long interim it turned out to be. After two and a half
years of uncertainty, proposed Stark II regulations were published
in January of 1998.160 Far from clarifying the prohibitions,

156

See Medicare Program: Physician Ownership of, and Referrals to,
Health Care Entities That Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services, 57 Fed. Reg.
8,588 (proposed Mar. 11, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411). An interim
final rule concerning only Stark I reporting requirements was published in
December of 1991. Medicare Program; Reporting Requirements for Financial
Relationships Between Physicians and Health Care Entities that Furnish
Selected Items and Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 61,374 (Dec. 3, 1991) (codified at 42
C.F.R. § 411.361 (2003)).
157
Medicare Program: Physician Ownership of, and Referrals to, Health
Care Entities That Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services and Financial
Relationship Reporting Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,914 (Aug. 14, 1995)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. § 411.350 (2003)).
158
Id.
159
Id. at 41,916.
160
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care
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however, the proposal proved to be exceedingly controversial, in
large part because some of the provisions went beyond what the
statute required (or perhaps allowed).161 The rule included a
number of new exceptions to the self-referral ban and proposed
significant revisions to components of the key group practice
definition, leading one group of attorneys to conclude that the
proposal “raise[s] as many questions as it answers.”162
Once again, any hope of a speedy resolution to these questions
was dashed. A “final” Stark II rule was published in January of
2001, three years after the proposed rule and a full six years after
the revised law went into effect.163 Despite filling 110 pages of the
Federal Register, however, the Stark saga was by no means
over.164 Instead, HCFA indicated that the regulations merely
comprised Phase I of the final regulations, addressing the basic
Stark II prohibition, definitions, and general exceptions; a
subsequent “Phase II” rule would be needed to address the
remaining provisions of the statute, including additional
exceptions, reporting requirements, and sanctions.165 Moreover,
HCFA delayed the effective date of the regulations for a year to
allow time for providers to comment and comply with the new
requirements.166
Health care providers were not amused. A prominent group of
Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1,659
(proposed Jan. 9, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435 & 455).
161
See, e.g., Id. at 1,682 (refusing to exclude lithotripsy from the definition
of “inpatient hospital services” despite requests to do so). This decision was
later held to be erroneous. Am. Lithotripsy Soc’y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp. 2d
23 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that inclusion was contrary to congressional intent).
162
Self-Referral: HCFA Issues Proposed Rule Governing Physician Stark
II Referrals, 2 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 1, 1998) (quoting a
statement by the law firm of Winston & Strawn). See, e.g., Medicare and
Medicaid Programs, 63 Fed. Reg. at 1,687-91 (discussing group practices),
1,699 (discussing the new exception for “de minimis” compensation).
163
Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care
Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationships, 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan.
4, 2001) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 & 424 (2003)).
164
Id. at 856-965.
165
Id. at 856, 859-60 (describing phases).
166
Id. at 859.
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health care attorneys criticized the one-year delay, “call[ing] the
rule a ‘virtual’ regulatory event” and deriding HCFA’s “postpublication schizophrenia.”167 Nevertheless, providers and their
attorneys set to work to bring practices into compliance before the
rule took effect in January 2002. Unfortunately, even the one-year
delay was marked by problems. Soon after taking office in January
2001, President Bush postponed for sixty days the effective date of
any regulations that had not yet gone into effect, generating shortlived confusion about the future of the Stark II rule under the new
Administration.168 In November of 2001, CMS delayed the
effective date of one provision (the definition of the phrase “set in
advance” as applied to percentage compensation arrangements) yet
again, in order to give the agency time to reconsider its
approach.169 When the rule finally went into effect in January
2002, it inadvertently contained minor errors that CMS had
intended to repeal, which will require further revisions to the Phase

167

Self-Referral: Stark II “Virtual” Final Regulations Reflect HCFA
“Schizophrenia,” Attorneys Say, 5 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 257 (Mar.
21, 2001) (describing comments contained in a briefing by the American Health
Lawyers Association).
168
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care
Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships: Delay of Effective
Date of Final Rule and Technical Amendment, 66 Fed. Reg. 8771 (Feb. 2, 2001)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 & 424 (2003)). Despite the initial confusion,
CMS took the position that the Administration’s action only delayed a discrete
subsection of the regulations concerning home health agencies, which had been
scheduled to take effect in February 2001. Id.
169
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care
Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships: Partial Delay of
Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 60,154 (Dec. 3, 2001). In November 2002 and
April 2003, CMS delayed the effective date of this provision for additional six
month periods “in order to avoid unnecessarily disrupting existing contractual
arrangements for physician services.” Medicare and Medicaid Programs;
Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial
Relationships: Extension of Partial Delay of Effective Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,322
(Nov. 22, 2002). See also Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’
Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial
Relationships: Extension of Partial Delay of Effective Date, 68 Fed. Reg. 20,347
(April 25, 2003).
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I regulations.170 Thus, more than a decade after the enactment of
the original Stark legislation, health care providers do not yet have
access to final regulations interpreting the law’s complicated
prohibition. As one commentator wryly noted, “[a]lthough the
intent was to provide comprehensive bright line rules, regulators
have had great difficulty in figuring out where the lines are.”171
While most health care fraud regulations do not have quite as
tortured a history as the Stark Law, this saga illustrates that
traditional regulation can be an extraordinarily cumbersome
process. In the complicated and constantly evolving arena of health
care financial relationships, the advantages offered by binding
regulations, developed after extensive public input, may well be
outweighed by the necessity of generating more timely forms of
guidance.
B. Information
Growing concern about the disadvantages of traditional noticeand-comment rulemaking led to the development of what I call
information: the proliferation of sources of health care fraud
guidance outside the traditional regulatory process. These informal
forms of guidance are used to convey the agency’s current
interpretation of the law to the health care community. As former
HHS Inspector General June Gibbs Brown noted in an Open Letter
to Health Care Providers, “[t]hrough public awareness efforts . . .
we alert the provider community of our concerns and hope to
encourage self-correcting behavior.”172 As described below,
170

See Self-Referral: CMS Fails to Remove Portion of Rule Effective Jan.
4, Despite Earlier Statement, 6 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 9,
2002) (quoting a letter written by a CMS representative acknowledging the
error). Moreover, a federal district court enjoined implementation of one aspect
of the definition of “designated health services,” holding that the inclusion of
lithotripsy in the definition was contrary to congressional intent. Am. Lithotripsy
Soc’y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002).
171
David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Changes,
Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEG. STUD. 531,
551 (2001) [hereinafter, Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse].
172
Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Office of Inspector General, An Open
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however, the necessity of relying on informal interpretive materials
can have significant repercussions for health care providers, both
under administrative law principles and in terms of day-to-day
practice.
1.

Forms of Health Care Fraud Information

Various forms of health care fraud information are now
available to health care providers, including both statutorily
mandated advisory processes and informal guidance mechanisms
developed solely within HHS. While some types of guidance are
binding on the entities who request the advice, they may not be
binding on the general public—although judges may nonetheless
find the agency’s views to be persuasive.173 Among the most
common forms of fraud guidance are Advisory Opinions, Special
Fraud Alerts, Compliance Program Guidances, and Special
Advisory Bulletins.
a. Advisory Opinions
HIPAA required the Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the
Attorney General, to provide written Advisory Opinions as to
whether a proposed transaction would, inter alia, violate the AntiKickback Statute or subject the requestor to civil monetary
penalties or exclusion.174 Advisory Opinions are thus an example
Letter to Health Care Providers (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/docs/openletters/openletter.htm.
173
See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
174
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b) (2003); 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008 (2003). The
original Advisory Opinion mandate expired in August 2000, but was
permanently reinstated as part of the 2001 appropriations process. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 543, 114 Stat. 2763
(2001). A similar process is required under the Stark Law, although few
opinions have been issued. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(6) (2003); 42 C.F.R. §§
411.370 (2003) et seq. Despite initial concern that Advisory Opinions could
only be requested for activities already underway, the regulations made clear
that requests may pertain to activities “which the requestor in good faith plans to
undertake.” 42 C.F.R. § 1008.15(a) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1128D(b)(2)
(2003) (opinions are available concerning arrangement/activity or proposed
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of “voluntary preclearance,” a form of intermediate ex ante
regulatory enforcement.175 Mindful of resource constraints and
inter-agency conflicts, Congress specified that Advisory Opinions
could not address whether a transaction involves fair market value
or whether an individual qualifies as a bona fide employee under
the Internal Revenue Code.176 While Advisory Opinions are
binding only as to the Secretary of HHS and the requestor(s), they
are made available to the public (in redacted form) on the agency’s
web site.177 Even if third parties are not entitled to rely on the
conclusions, however, Advisory Opinions nonetheless function as
valuable sources of information as to the agency’s likely views
regarding analogous transactions.
Despite offering a relatively informal mechanism for obtaining
guidance from the OIG, the Advisory Opinion process remains
cumbersome.178 Although the OIG is required to issue an Opinion
within sixty days after accepting a request, that time period is
tolled by requests for additional information, requests for payment,
and decisions to seek external expert consultation.179 Moreover, in
order to obtain an Opinion the requestor must submit “[a] complete
and specific description of all relevant information bearing on the
arrangement . . . and on the circumstances of the conduct,”
including copies of all operative documents for existing
arrangements, and copies of drafts, model documents, or

arrangement/activity). However, hypothetical requests are not acceptable. 42
C.F.R. § 1008.15(b).
175
Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1289. For a description of similar processes in
other agencies, see, e.g., id. at 1289-91 (describing various agency practices);
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1395 (1998) (describing business
review letters issued by the DOJ Antitrust Division).
176
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(3).
177
See id. § 1320a-7d(b)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 1008.53 (identifying affected
parties). A complete list of advisory opinions is available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
fraud/advisoryopinions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
178
See Phyllis A. Avery & Andrew B. Wachler, Advisory Opinion
Regulations Will Discourage Many Potential Requestors, HEALTH LAW., Vol. 9,
No. 6, at 24 (1997).
179
42 C.F.R. § 1008.43(c).
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descriptions of proposed terms for contemplated arrangements.180
Significant resources thus must be expended to develop the
information needed to support the request—a request that may well
result in the abandonment of the transaction.181 In addition, the
OIG retains the right to rescind, terminate or modify a previous
Opinion upon reconsideration of the issues involved, although the
requestor will be given an opportunity to discontinue or modify its
actions.182 Thus, the advice available through the Advisory
Opinion process is by no means as timely, easily obtained, or
reliable as it might first appear.
b. Special Fraud Alerts
The OIG periodically issues Special Fraud Alerts in areas in
which the agency believes there may be abuse, particularly those
involving improper referrals under the Anti-Kickback Statute.183
Rather than setting out discrete tests for liability, Special Fraud
Alerts merely identify “suspect practices” that may attract
scrutiny.184 While a health care provider who engages in one of

180

Id. § 1008.36(b)(4).
See Scott D. Godshall, Death By Regulation: HHS’s Advisory Opinion
Guidelines, ANDREWS HEALTH CARE FRAUD LITIG. REP., May 1997, at 3. “In
other words, regulatory advice—which may kill the deal entirely—is not
available until the parties have gone through the time and expense of drafting
and negotiating each of the contracts and agreements necessary to finalize the
deal . . . In terms of business planning and compliance, a decision to withhold
regulatory advice until the deal is all but executed is a decision to make the
advice largely meaningless.” Id.
182
42 C.F.R. § 1008.45 (explaining procedures for rescission, termination,
or modification).
183
See, e.g., Special Fraud Alert: Hospital Incentives to Physicians (May
1992), reprinted in Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg.
65,372, 65,373 (Dec. 19, 1994) (describing Alerts).
184
See, e.g., id. at 65,375-76 (listing suspect hospital incentives, such as the
provision of free or significantly discounted items, spaces, or services); Special
Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug Market Schemes (Aug. 1994), reprinted in id. at
65,376 (identifying possible improper payments and gifts from drug
manufacturers, including those offered to physicians in exchange for prescribing
a manufacturer’s products); Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements for the Provision
181
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these suspect practices is not automatically in violation of the law,
the Fraud Alert serves to put the provider on notice that the
practice may attract attention.
Special Fraud Alerts occupy a unique position on the spectrum
of health care fraud guidance. Unlike the safe harbors or Advisory
Opinions, there is no explicit legislative authority for the issuance
of Fraud Alerts; instead, they are an exercise of the agency’s
general administrative interpretive authority.185 For many years,
the OIG issued internal fraud alerts “to identify fraudulent and
abusive practices within the health care industry.”186 In 1989, the
agency began to issue periodic alerts intended for wider
publication distribution, explaining:
[T]he OIG Special Fraud Alerts have served to provide
general guidance to the health care industry on violations of
Federal law (including various aspects of the anti-kickback
statute), as well as to provide additional insight to the
Medicare carrier fraud units in identifying health care fraud
schemes.187
Despite their unofficial status and highly fact-specific nature, the
OIG has viewed such Alerts quite favorably; indeed, the agency
offered the Special Fraud Alert mechanism as an alternative to
adopting an earlier iteration of the Advisory Opinion process.188
Congress officially recognized the existence of Special Fraud
Alerts in HIPAA, which created a mechanism for private parties to

of Clinical Lab Services (Oct. 1994), reprinted in id., at 65,377-78 (identifying
problematic inducements by clinical laboratories, including providing free
services to physicians who generate business for the laboratory).
185
See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (discussing interpretive
authority).
186
See Notice, Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. at
65,373 (describing the history of fraud alerts).
187
Id.
188
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (July 29, 1991)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2003)) (declining to create an advisory opinion
process for Anti-Kickback queries, and indicating “that OIG fraud alerts are the
best mechanism for imparting practical and continuing guidance to individuals
and entities seeking to avoid violations of the statute”).
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request that the OIG issue an Alert to “inform the public of
practices which the [OIG] considers to be suspect or of particular
concern” under the federal health care programs.189 In recent years,
Special Fraud Alerts have addressed such topics as nursing home
arrangements with hospice programs, home health fraud, rental of
physician office space by entities to which the physician refers
patients, and physician liability for fraudulent medical equipment
and home health certifications.190
c. Compliance Program Guidances
One of the most significant recent developments in health care
fraud and abuse has been the increasing emphasis on corporate
compliance. Since the mid-1990s, it has become standard practice
for the OIG and DOJ to require health care providers to enter into
corporate integrity agreements (CIAs) as a condition of settling
health care fraud allegations, most often in return for the OIG’s
agreement not to seek the provider’s exclusion from the federal
health care programs.191 Although each CIA is tailored to the
specific conduct at issue, common elements include the
appointment of a compliance officer, the development of
compliance training procedures in key areas (such as billing rules),
the development of confidential mechanisms by which employees
can report potential violations, and the submission of reports to the
government documenting the provider’s compliance efforts.192 The
189

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(c) (2003) (permitting such requests).
A complete list of Special Fraud Alerts can be found at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/fraudalerts.html#1 (last visited July 15, 2002).
191
See Office of Inspector Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreements: General
Information, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html#1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). As
the OIG explains, “A provider or entity consents to these obligations as part of
the civil settlement and in exchange for the OIG’s agreement not to seek an
exclusion of that health care provider or entity from participation in Medicare,
Medicaid and other Federal health care programs.” Id. See also Thomas E.
Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of Health Care
Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 55 (1997) (explaining CIA
requirements).
192
A list of common elements, as well as a list of current CIAs, can be
found on the OIG’s web site. See http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html#1 (last
190
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reporting and oversight provisions are onerous and typically last
for at least five years.193
Not surprisingly, the emphasis has moved from compliance as
a remedy to compliance as a preventive mechanism. The genesis of
voluntary compliance efforts, resulting in so-called “corporate
compliance programs,” can be traced to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations, which went into effect in 1991.194
The Guidelines permit the court to reduce an organization’s
culpability score “[i]f the offense occurred despite an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of the law.”195 An
effective program requires, at a minimum, that the organization:
establish, communicate, monitor, and enforce compliance
standards and procedures for its employees and contractors; assign
responsibility for compliance to specific high-level personnel;
refrain from delegating authority to individuals with a history of
illegal behavior; and take appropriate steps when an offense is
detected.196 Although the Guidelines only apply to organizations
convicted of criminal activities, the OIG has indicated that a
compliance program may also benefit organizations accused of
violating civil laws—both by preventing some improper activities
from occurring in the first place and by minimizing the
organization’s exposure if wrongdoing is detected and reported on
a timely basis.197
Rather than requiring each health care provider to create a
visited Feb. 14, 2003).
193
Id.
194
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (sentencing of
organizations) (2001); Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 191, at 55 (tracing the
emphasis on corporate compliance to the Guidelines).
195
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f).
196
Id. at § 8A1.1, Commentary 3(k). These provisions also form the basis
for the common CIA elements noted above. See supra note 192 and
accompanying text.
197
See, e.g., Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospices, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,031, 54,033 (Oct. 5, 1999) (describing the benefits of
a compliance program). For details as to when such leniency may be applicable,
see id. at 54,033 n.5 (referencing sources); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2003)
(providing that a person who voluntarily discloses a violation of the FCA may
be subject to double, rather than treble, damages).
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program anew, the OIG has published a series of “Compliance
Program Guidances” designed to guide members of a particular
sector of the health care industry in establishing their own
voluntary compliance programs.198 While adherence to these
Guidances are not mandatory (and may not be feasible for smaller
entities), the documents provide valuable advice as to what the
OIG believes are the key compliance issues for such providers. As
the OIG has stated:
The adoption and implementation of voluntary compliance
programs significantly advance the prevention of fraud,
abuse and waste in these health care plans while at the
same time further the fundamental mission of [the
providers] . . . . [R]egardless of a [provider’s] size and
structure, the OIG believes that every [provider] can and
should strive to accomplish the objectives and principles
underlying all of the compliance policies and procedures
recommended within this guidance.199
The OIG issued a Model Compliance Plan for Clinical
Laboratories in 1997, following several highly publicized fraud
settlements involving national laboratory companies.200 By June
2003, the OIG had issued Compliance Guidances for hospitals,
clinical laboratories, home health agencies, third-party medical
billing companies, durable medical equipment suppliers, hospices,
Medicare+Choice organizations, nursing facilities, individual and
small group physician practices, pharmaceutical manufacturers,
198

See HHS Office of Inspector General, Fraud Prevention and Protection,
Compliance Guidance, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/ complianceguidance.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2004) (listing guidelines).
199
Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospices, 64
Fed. Reg. at 54,032.
200
See Notice, Publication of the OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical
Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,435 (Mar. 3, 1997); United States ex rel. Wagner v.
Allied Clin. Labs., No. C-1-94-092, 1995 WL 254405 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (settling
allegations that a laboratory billed for tests not supported by patient diagnoses).
The model plan was revised in 1998 to better track the format of subsequent
Guidances. See Notice, Publication of OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Clinical Laboratories, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,076 (Aug. 24, 1998) (revising Guidance
“to refine and build on” the original document).
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and ambulance companies.201 Thus, a wide range of health care
providers can consult Guidances directly targeting their practices,
while many others can argue by analogy from Guidances designed
for similar entities.202
d. Special Advisory Bulletins
The OIG has also issued several Special Advisory Bulletins,
which offer additional guidance as to whether health care activities
will violate federal law.203 Bulletins are similar to Special Fraud
Alerts in that they address a range of impermissible activities,
rather than answering specific queries from health care
providers.204 In other respects, however, the issues addressed in
Bulletins do not fit the Special Fraud Alert model, in part because
they concern a wider range of fraud laws. Recent Bulletins have
addressed the practices of billing consultants, the patient antidumping statute, the effect of exclusion from the federal health
care programs, and the offering of gifts and other inducements to
beneficiaries.205 Although Bulletins are not explicitly authorized by
law, the OIG typically grounds its authority in HIPAA’s broad
mandate that the agency provide “guidance” to the health care
201

For a complete list, see HHS, Office of Inspector General, Fraud
Prevention & Detection, Compliance Guidance, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
complianceguidance.html (last visited June 16, 2003).
202
It is unclear whether the compliance effort ultimately will prove
successful. See Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 566
(arguing “there is a big difference between a compliance program and a
compliance norm, and provider norms have proved extremely resistant to
change”).
203
See HHS Office of Inspector General, Fraud Alerts, Bulletins and Other
Guidance, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/fraudalerts.html#2 (last visited Feb. 14,
2003).
204
Id.
205
Id. The issuance of an informal Bulletin does not preclude the
subsequent development of binding regulations on the topic. See, e.g.,
Solicitation of Public Comments on Exceptions Under Section 1128A(a)(5) of
the Social Security Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,892 (Dec. 9, 2002) (following up on the
August 2002 Special Advisory Bulletin: Offering Gifts and Other Inducements
to Beneficiaries).
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industry regarding fraudulent conduct.206
Perhaps the most controversial Special Advisory Bulletin to
date was the July 1999 Bulletin concerning “Gainsharing
Arrangements.”207 In that Bulletin, the OIG construed a civil
monetary penalty (CMP) provision prohibiting hospitals from
knowingly making payments to a physician as an inducement to
reduce or limit services to Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries under
the physician’s care.208 The OIG interpreted this provision to
prohibit “gainsharing,” which it defined as “an arrangement in
which a hospital gives physicians a percentage share of any
reduction in the hospital’s cost for patient care attributable in part
to the physicians’ efforts.”209 While acknowledging that hospitals
have legitimate reasons for desiring that physicians support costcontainment efforts, the OIG nonetheless stated that the CMP
prohibited a hospital from compensating a physician directly or
indirectly based on cost savings derived from the treatment of the
physician’s own patients.210 The Bulletin has proven to be quite
controversial, particularly in light of the Internal Revenue
Service’s earlier approval of the tax consequences of similar
arrangements.211
206

See Notice, Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on
Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians to
Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,985 (July 14, 1999),
available
at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/gainsh.htm
[hereinafter Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements] (stating
that “[t]he Fraud and Abuse Control Program, established by [HIPAA],
authorized the OIG to provide guidance to the health care industry to prevent
fraud and abuse, and to promote the highest level of ethical and lawful
conduct”).
207
See id.
208
See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) (2003).
209
See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note
206.
210
Id.
211
See, e.g., Gregory M. Luce & Jesse A. Witten, HHS IG’s Gainsharing
Prohibition Lacks Legal Support, 3 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 753
(Aug. 11, 1999) (characterizing the OIG’s reasoning as “dubious,” and arguing
that “the OIG relie[d] upon a selective account of the legislative history”); IRA
Approves Gainsharing Programs in Two Unreleased Private Letter Rulings, 8
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Similar to Special Fraud Alerts, the issuance of such Bulletins
is purely within the agency’s discretion.212 In fact, the Gainsharing
Bulletin itself arose out of several requests for Advisory Opinions
concerning gainsharing arrangements.213 Finding that a variety of
concerns made the issue unsuitable for individual Opinions,
including the high risk of abuse, the need for ongoing oversight,
and the need for comprehensive regulations rather than case-bycase analysis, the OIG chose instead to issue the industry-wide
Bulletin.214 It is likely this mechanism will be used in the future to
disseminate information outside the Special Fraud Alert context,
especially when the government’s concerns encompass laws
beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute.
e. Other Forms of Guidance
In addition to these categories, the OIG from time to time
offers other types of guidance to the health care industry. For
example, the HHS Inspector General periodically posts “Open
Letters” to the health care community on the agency’s web site,
designed to explain the agency’s goals and priorities.215 In
addition, the OIG periodically releases redacted versions of AntiKickback-related correspondence. For example, in April 2000, the
OIG posted copies of two letters addressing providers who
impermissibly charge the federal health care programs amounts
that are “substantially in excess” of the provider’s usual charge for
the services provided.216 While these postings have the virtue of

HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) 295 (Feb. 25, 1999) (describing two private letter
rulings approving gainsharing arrangements between tax-exempt hospitals and
physician groups).
212
See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note
206.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
For a list of such documents, see HHS, Office of Inspector General,
Fraud Prevention & Detection, Open Letters, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
openletters.html (last visited July 15, 2002).
216
The correspondence is available at HHS Office of Inspector General,
Fraud Prevention & Detection, Fraud Alerts, Bulletins, and Guidance,
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making the OIG’s current interpretations accessible to anyone with
an Internet connection, their legal effects remain unclear.
2.

Reliance on Informal Guidance

The government’s evolving views of these informal sources of
fraud guidance is instructive, particularly with regard to Advisory
Opinions. Despite numerous requests from health care providers,
historically the OIG was vehemently opposed to instituting an
Advisory Opinion process under the Anti-Kickback Statute.217
During the notice-and-comment period for the proposed safe
harbor regulations, the agency received numerous comments
requesting the development of an advisory mechanism.218 Citing
the statute’s criminal provisions, which are enforced by the DOJ,
the OIG concluded that it lacked “authority to make judgments that
are within the exclusive domain of another agency.”219 Noting the
practical problems caused by the “knowing and willful” intent
requirement, as well as the resources that such a process would
require, the OIG argued that the safe harbor regulations were the
most appropriate mechanism for addressing provider concerns:
[W]e do not believe that an advisory opinion process is a
necessary or appropriate mechanism for keeping the
Department aware of new developments in industry
practice and ensuring that the regulation remains
current . . . . We believe that periodic updating of this
regulation, with the opportunity for public input, is the best
way to ensure that these regulations remain practical and
relevant in the face of changes in health care delivery and
payment arrangements.220
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/fraudalerts.html#3b (last visited July 15, 2002).
217
See, e.g., Godshall, supra note 181, at 3 (describing the convoluted
Advisory Opinion regulations as “demonstrat[ing] the agency’s continuing
opposition” to the process); supra note 188 and accompanying text.
218
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (July 29, 1991)
(describing comments).
219
Id.
220
Id.
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The OIG’s comments thus reflected serious concerns about agency
authority and resources, as well as a clear preference for the
traditional regulatory process.
With the passage of HIPAA, however, many of these concerns
disappeared. The explicit grant of advisory authority to HHS,
combined with a mandate for interagency coordination, assuaged
concerns about potential interference with DOJ investigations.
Resource concerns were addressed by the HIPAA funding
provisions, including the creation of the Fraud and Abuse Control
Program.221 Over time, OIG personnel apparently realized that the
advisory process could be a very good way of making the agency’s
views known in a timely and informal manner. By the summer of
2001, agency personnel appeared to have done an about-face, and
strongly supported permanent extension of the Advisory Opinion
authority.222
In addition to this curious pedigree, the proliferation of these
quasi-official forms of guidance has important practical
implications for health care providers. For one thing, there are
many more places to look for guidance on specific fraud issues
than in the past. In addition to consulting the statute and safe
harbors, and poring over the relevant Federal Register preambles,
health care attorneys now must scrutinize all relevant Advisory
Opinions, Special Fraud Alerts, Compliance Program Guidances,
Special Advisory Bulletins, and other forms of guidance. Although
most of this information is available on the OIG’s web site, it tends
to be organized in loose topical and chronological fashion (rather
than, for example, keyed to the relevant statutory provisions).223
221

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(3) (2003) (describing appropriations to the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account); supra Part I.
222
See Testimony of Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal
Affairs, Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, at http://oig.hhs.gov/
reading/testimony/2001/072601lm.pdf (July 26, 2001) (“In addition to assisting
the health care industry [to] comply with the law, the advisory opinion and safe
harbor mechanisms enhance the OIG’s understanding of new and emerging
health care business arrangements and guide the development of new safe
harbor regulations, fraud alerts, and advisory bulletins.”).
223
See HHS, Office of Inspector General, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
index.html (indexing documents) (last visited June 19, 2003).
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Moreover, this additional guidance does not necessarily clarify the
ambiguities faced by providers on a daily basis. Especially with
Advisory Opinions and correspondence, attorneys must try to
extrapolate general principles from the government’s response to a
specific set of facts, and then combine that information with the
binding guidance found in the law and safe harbor provisions.
Thus, there is a distinct risk that the proliferation of unofficial
sources of guidance results simply in more—rather than better—
information regarding health care fraud.
In addition, because such unofficial guidance generally is not
binding, such advice is not always consistent. For example, in its
July 1999 Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG stated that
gainsharing arrangements were not an appropriate topic for
Advisory Opinions.224 But in January 2001, with little fanfare (and
even less attention to the previous Bulletin), the OIG issued an
Advisory Opinion approving a transaction that was in essence a
gainsharing arrangement.225 Perhaps, as the OIG argued, the new
proposal departed so significantly from previous gainsharing
proposals that different treatment was warranted,226 or perhaps the
Opinion signaled the OIG’s retreat from its previous hard-line
prohibition. Of course, no one would argue that agency
interpretations should not evolve over time; indeed, the ability to
be responsive to changes in industry practice is one of the greatest
advantages of informal guidance. Nonetheless, the lack of any
formal mechanism to warn of policy shifts can make it difficult for
health care providers to plan future transactions that may implicate
these concerns.
Moreover, administrative law principles have significant
repercussions for health care providers who seek to challenge—or
224

See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note
206 (stating that requests “contain common elements that preclude our issuance
of any favorable opinion,” including high risk of abuse, need for ongoing
oversight, and need for comprehensive regulation in the area).
225
OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-1 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at http://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/ao01-01.pdf (declining to impose
sanctions for a proposal involving a hospital sharing a percentage of cost savings
with cardiac surgeons who implement certain cost reduction measures).
226
Id.
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even to rely on—such quasi-official agency interpretations. As
noted above, pursuant to the APA, the Social Security Act requires
notice-and-comment rulemaking for any “rule, requirement, or
other statement of policy . . . that establishes or changes a
substantive legal standard governing the scope of benefits [or] the
payment for services” under the Medicare program.227 However,
the APA requirement does not apply “to interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice.”228 In determining whether rulemaking is required, courts
have focused on whether the rule is “interpretive” or “legislative”
in nature.
An interpretive rule simply states what the administrative
agency thinks the [underlying] statute means, and only
reminds affected parties of existing duties. On the other
hand, if by its action the agency intends to create new law,
rights, or duties, the rule is properly considered to be a
legislative rule.229
It is likely that most of OIG fraud guidance would qualify as
interpretive rules under this test, and hence would not be subject to
challenge unless they adopted a new position that was inconsistent
with prior law or regulations.230
Disputes over the nature of agency policy usually arise when a
health care provider seeks to challenge the agency’s informal
interpretation as contrary to established law, and thus subject to the
APA rulemaking requirements.231 In the majority of cases, federal
227

42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2003); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2003).
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
229
Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1992);
see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (providing the test for determining whether a rule is
interpretive or legislative).
230
See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (stating
“that APA rulemaking would . . . be required if [the rule] adopted a new position
inconsistent with any of the Secretary’s existing regulations”).
231
Many such cases arise when a provider asks a court to enjoin the
enforcement of the challenged provision. The timing of judicial review of
Medicare cases is complex and has been extensively litigated, generally in the
context of whether a provider has “exhausted” the relevant administrative
228
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courts have held that Medicare manuals, letters, and directives are
interpretive in nature. Indeed, the Supreme Court described one of
the Medicare program manuals as “a prototypical example of an
interpretive rule.”232 On rare occasion, however, courts have found
a specific policy to be contrary to law. For example, in Loyola
University of Chicago v. Bowen, the Seventh Circuit refused to
defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of regulations governing
hospital reimbursement for education expenses, on the grounds
that the Medicare Carriers Manual provision on which the
Secretary relied contained a requirement not found in the law or
regulations.233 As the court noted, “[a]lthough the Secretary’s
interpretation of his own regulations is usually accorded substantial
deference . . . such deference is appropriate only if the Secretary’s
interpretation of the regulation is consistent with the language of
review processes prior to going to court. Briefly, prior to 1986, the Social
Security Act did not permit judicial review of the amount of Medicare Part B
benefits. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982). Moreover,
the Supreme Court had held that judicial review of claims “arising under”
Medicare Part A was available only after the claimant pursued all levels of
available HHS review and the Secretary rendered a “final decision.” See Heckler
v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1984). However, in the 1986 case of Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, the Supreme Court permitted an
immediate judicial challenge to a Medicare Part B regulation, noting that the law
“simply does not speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such
amounts are to be determined rather than the determinations themselves.” 476
U.S. 667, 675-76 (1986) (emphasis added). The situation was further
complicated by a 1986 amendment permitting judicial review of the “amount of
benefits” under both Medicare Part A and Part B, which may have mooted the
amount/methodology distinction and required exhaustion of remedies for all
disputes. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509,
100 Stat. 1874 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a) (2003)); Shalala v. Illinois
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (2000) (interpreting Bowen
to permit review in cases where plaintiff “can obtain no review at all unless it
can obtain judicial review in a [federal question] action”).
232
Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 99 (construing a Provider
Reimbursement Manual provision authorizing the Secretary to depart from
generally accepted accounting principles when making certain reimbursement
decisions).
233
905 F.2d 1061, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the Secretary’s
contention that education activities must occur in a facility that is “part of the
provider” in order to be reimbursed by Medicare).
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the regulations themselves.”234 Unless such a showing could be
made regarding one of the OIG’s informal fraud guidance
documents, however, a challenge likely would be unavailing.235
Unlike HHS’ interpretation of the Medicare billing
requirements, however, the focus of fraud guidance is not
primarily on reimbursement methodology. Of course, the Medicare
carriers and intermediaries strive to identify fraud (and to deny
payment) at the time bills are submitted.236 But the primary manner
in which the fraud laws are enforced is through the administrative,
civil, and criminal adjudication processes outlined above.237 While
a carrier or intermediary may “flag” a particular set of claims as
raising concerns under the FCA or the Anti-Kickback Statute, the
contractor has no authority to adjudicate the claimant’s guilt;
instead, the case must be referred to the OIG (and possibly on to
the DOJ) for investigation and prosecution.238 In any resulting
litigation against the claimant, the agency’s guidance will likely
play a pivotal role in determining whether the law was violated,
234

Id. at 1071; see also Am. Lithotripsy Soc’y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp.
2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that regulation defining lithotripsy as a Stark II
“designated health service” was contrary to Congressional intent).
235
See, e.g., Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 94-95 (finding that the
Manual provision authorizing departure from generally accepted accounting
principles “is a reasonable regulatory interpretation, and we must defer to it”);
Downtown Med. Ctr./Comprehensive Health Care Clinic v. Bowen, 944 F.2d
756, 768-69 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that a Medicare Carrier’s Manual
provision construing billing requirements was “reasonable and not inconsistent
with the statute and regulations”).
236
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(g)(1) (providing that no payment may be
made for designated health services furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral
under the Stark Law) & 1893 (creating the Medicare Integrity Program, under
which HHS is authorized to enter into contracts with entities—including existing
carriers and intermediaries—to carry out a variety of fraud detection and
prevention activities).
237
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001, subch. B (2003) (setting out procedures
for imposing exclusion), 1003 (setting out procedures for imposing civil
monetary penalties, assessments, and exclusions) & 1005 (describing the
appeals process for exclusions, civil monetary penalties, and assessments).
238
See, e.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000)
(finding sufficient evidence from which the jury could have convicted the
defendant of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute).
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even in situations where the agency’s interpretation is not directly
binding.
For example, Advisory Opinions are binding only on the
parties who request them.239 In Zimmer, Inc. v. Nu Tech Med., Inc.,
a manufacturer of orthopedic products sought to extricate itself
from a consignment agreement with a supplier by arguing that the
contract violated the Anti-Kickback Statute.240 In support of its
contention, the manufacturer sought and received an Advisory
Opinion from the OIG characterizing the agreement as
“problematic” and “potentially abusive,” and refusing to immunize
the relationship from prosecution.241 While noting that the Opinion
did not bind any agency other than HHS, the court acknowledged
that “[n]onetheless, courts give great deference to agency
regulations and agency interpretations of those regulations,” and
found it proper for the plaintiff to introduce the Opinion into
evidence.242 The court ultimately agreed with the OIG’s analysis of
the facts and held that because the agreement violated the AntiKickback Statute, it was void and unenforceable under Indiana
law.243
As this example suggests, courts will look to the agency’s
interpretation of the fraud and abuse statutes not only in
enforcement actions against a defendant health care provider, but
also in civil actions between the parties to an agreement. For
example, in Polk County v. Peters, a hospital unsuccessfully sued a
physician for money the hospital had advanced pursuant to a
recruitment agreement.244 Noting that the OIG had issued a Special
Fraud Alert detailing suspect hospital incentives to physicians—
many of which were present in the case—the court found the
239

See 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7d(b)(4) (2003) (describing the effect of
opinions).
240
54 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
241
Id. at 854-56 (quoting Advisory Opinion No. 98-1, Mar. 19, 1998,
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/1998/ao98_19. pdf).
242
54 F. Supp. 2d at 856. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its
own statutory mandate).
243
54 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
244
800 F. Supp. 1451 (E. D. Tex. 1992).
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agreement to be in violation of the anti-referral statutes, and thus
void and unenforceable under Texas law.245 Such cases raise the
possibility that plaintiffs may be able to use this guidance as a tool
to help them avoid onerous health care contracts as against public
policy—something of an odd result for guidance designed
primarily to protect patients, rather than to assist providers who are
dissatisfied with their business deals.
Just as health care providers have a limited ability to challenge
such informal sources of agency guidance, it similarly is unclear
how far they are entitled to rely on them to defend their actions. As
the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]nterpretive rules do not require
notice and comments, although . . . they also do not have the force
and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the
adjudicatory process.”246 It is well-accepted that the government
cannot be estopped by erroneous representations made by its
employees and agents, particularly regarding questions of benefit
entitlements.247 In the health care context, courts have held that
providers are not entitled to rely on erroneous oral advice from
carriers and intermediaries with regard to Medicare rules and
regulations.248 The fact that the relevant forms of OIG guidance are

245

Id. at 1455-56. Another district court cited the same Special Fraud Alert
in a similar physician recruitment case, but found that unlike in Polk, the
agreement’s language was ambiguous enough to preclude summary judgment
with respect to whether patient referrals were required in return for the hospital’s
payment. See Feldstein v. Nash Community Health Servs., Inc., 51 F. Supp 673
(E.D.N.C. 1999).
246
Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995).
247
See Office of Personal Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 414 (1990)
(holding that erroneous oral and written advice regarding a claimant’s eligibility
for disability benefits did not entitle the claimant to benefits that were not
authorized by law).
248
In so holding, courts often focus on the provider’s duty to be familiar
with relevant program requirements. See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Health
Servs. of Crawford County, 647 U.S. 51, 64 (1984) (refusing to bind the
government to oral advice given by a fiscal intermediary regarding whether
certain salary payments were reimbursable as reasonable costs under Medicare,
and noting that “[a]s a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a
duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement”);
Downtown Med. Ctr./Comprehensive Health Care Clinic v. Bowen, 944 F.2d
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written, however, is unlikely to provide protection; indeed, the
challenged advice in one such case included not only oral
statements, but also an outdated government form containing the
erroneous information.249 It is not inconceivable, then, that a
provider might have difficulty relying on informal guidance in its
defense, at least if the government’s views have since changed.
Nonetheless, a provider’s reliance on fraud guidance should be
strengthened by the fact that the majority of health care fraud laws
require evidence of the defendant’s fraudulent intent before a
violation can be established.250 Although reliance on erroneous
agency statements will not establish a defense as a matter of law,
the fact that the defendant sought in good faith to comply with
such advice may establish that the defendant lacked the requisite
intent needed to violate the law.251 Moreover, to the extent the
government desires that informal guidance strengthen its
relationship with the industry, it would be counterproductive to
revise agency policy without giving providers enough time to
comply with new interpretations.252 For example, mindful that the
Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements would

756, 760, 771 (10th Cir. 1991) (refusing to estop the government from denying
reimbursement for physical therapy and psychological services on the ground
that the Medicare carrier erroneously had advised the provider that it could bill
for the services under a single provider number).
249
See Office of Personal Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 417.
250
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (2003) (prohibiting defendants
from “knowingly and willfully” engaging in acts that violate the Anti-Kickback
Statute); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2003) (barring defendants from “knowingly”
submitting false claims under the FCA). The major exception is the Stark Law,
which has no intent requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (2003) (outlining
the prohibition).
251
See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Oliver v. Parsons Company, 195 F.3d
457, 464 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A contractor relying on a good faith interpretation of
a regulation is not subject to liability . . . because the good faith nature of his or
her action forecloses the possibility that the scienter requirement is met.”).
252
Cf. William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to
Participation in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201,
203 (1998) (arguing that “[r]educing idiosyncratic risks of doing business with
federal purchasing agencies is a key step toward establishing effective
public/private partnerships . . .”).
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come as a surprise to many providers, the OIG agreed to “take into
consideration in exercising its enforcement discretion whether
[such an] arrangement was terminated expeditiously following
publication of the Bulletin.”253 Thus, providers are unlikely to be
penalized for following agency advice as long as they seek to
revise their practices in a timely fashion. Nonetheless, providers
may find the potential for liability due to their reliance on outdated
advice to be unsettling, particularly when combined with other
practical difficulties raised by the proliferation of informal
guidance sources.
C. Litigation
The problems with both traditional forms of regulation and the
proliferation of informal guidance mechanisms have generated
attempts to address legal and regulatory ambiguity through
litigation based on novel interpretations of the underlying
provisions. The majority of these cases have been brought under
the FCA, either as direct government prosecutions or as private
actions under the law’s broad qui tam provisions. Such litigation is
traditionally viewed as an example of ex post enforcement, under
which the government investigates and prosecutes conduct by
entities who have violated the rules against health care fraud.254
The situation is complicated, however, by the existence of an
inordinate number of “gray areas” in federal health care program
reimbursement, the difficulty of detecting fraud during claims
processing, and the concomitantly low risk of an individual
provider being caught and disciplined for any misbehavior.255 As
253

Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note
206. See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 1008.45(b)(2)-(3) (2003) (providing that if the OIG
terminates or modifies a previously issued Advisory Opinion, it “will not
proceed against the requestor . . . if such action was promptly, diligently, and in
good faith” discontinued or modified within a reasonable period of time).
254
See Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1282-88 (describing public ex post
enforcement).
255
See Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 538-39
(describing the low likelihood of fraud being detected and punished); supra note
6 and accompanying text (explaining the complexity of federal health care
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Professor David Hyman has noted, “program administrators can
compensate for a low risk of detection/conviction (that is, ex ante
underinvestment in claims review) by imposing substantial ex post
sanctions for misconduct,” an approach that may be “relatively
unproblematic from an economic perspective . . . [but]
questionable on psychological grounds.”256 Moreover, when the
threat of such litigation can only be reduced by the defendant’s
agreement to abide by novel program conditions not otherwise
imposed by law or regulation, the settlement process may have the
effect of transforming an ex post enforcement mechanism into an
ex ante means of imposing compliance as the “price” of continued
participation in the programs.257 Thus, while these cases have met
with a certain degree of practical success, they raise a variety of
troubling procedural and jurisprudential concerns.
1.

Procedural Concerns

The procedural issues involved in the litigation process
primarily concern the role of the qui tam relator, particularly the
question of whether the relator has standing to maintain the suit if
the government declines to intervene.258 In Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, a company was
accused of billing the government for more hours than its
employees actually spent on federally funded projects; the United
States declined to intervene in the suit.259 The Supreme Court held
that in such circumstances, the relator has standing to sue as a

program requirements).
256
Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 540. See also
id. at 564 (characterizing the current process as the “haphazard extraction of ex
post discounts from some providers and the ritual sacrifice (either through
conviction/program exclusion or the imposition of staggering defense costs) of
other providers”).
257
Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1287 (describing immediate forms of
enforcement).
258
See Krause, supra note 49, at 158-61 (presenting a detailed analysis of
standing and fiscal harm). See id. at 136 n. 60 (discussing other procedural
issues raised by qui tam suits).
259
529 U.S. 765, 843-44 (2000).
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partial assignee of the government’s own damages claim.260 By
holding that the relator has standing only in a derivative capacity,
however, Stevens left open the issue of whether the government
would have standing in the absence of its own financial injury.
The Stevens Court did offer a modicum of guidance:
It is beyond doubt that the complaint asserts an injury to the
United States—both the injury to its sovereignty arising
from violation of its laws (which suffices to support a
criminal lawsuit by the Government) and the proprietary
injury resulting from the alleged fraud.261
In recognizing that the requisite harm can arise both from a
“proprietary” injury and from an injury to the government’s
“sovereignty,” the Court suggested that the government can be
harmed under the FCA in ways that are not primarily financial,
such as by violation of underlying program requirements or
interference with government functions.262 Because the allegations
in the case concerned both sovereign and proprietary injury,
however, the Court had no occasion to address whether nonproprietary injury, standing alone, would suffice.263 While Stevens
suggests that government standing is unlikely to be at issue in most
FCA cases, the question may remain open in the rare case where it
can be shown that the government suffered no conceivable harm
from the defendant’s acts.
Moreover, while Stevens resolved the Article III standing
question, it did not address whether qui tam suits violate the
Article II Appointments or Take Care Clauses of the United States
Constitution.264 The Article II issues have been developed most
fully in Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, where a former

260

Id. at 846 (holding “that the United States’ injury in fact suffices to
confer standing on respondent Stevens”).
261
Id. at 844.
262
See Krause, supra note 49, at 167-84 (discussing non-financial ways in
which government can be harmed by false claims).
263
529 U.S. 765.
264
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3; see Stevens, 529 U.S. at 848 n.8. But see
Stevens, 529 U.S. at 878 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the evidence was
“sufficient to resolve the Article II questions” as well).
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nurse sued a hospital under the qui tam provisions.265 Despite the
plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants had conspired to defraud
the United States Treasury, the government declined to intervene
in the suit.266 In 1997, before the Stevens case reached the Supreme
Court, a district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing.267 On
appeal, a fifth circuit panel held that Riley had standing to sue, but
that the suit violated the separation of powers doctrine and the
Take Care Clause.268 The court subsequently agreed to rehear the
case en banc, but delayed its decision pending the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Stevens.269 Finally, in May 2001, the Fifth
Circuit issued an en banc opinion holding that the alleged
delegation of prosecutorial power to the relator does not violate the
Take Care or Appointments Clauses.270 Nonetheless, in the
absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, the issue remains
controversial.
2.

Jurisprudential Concerns

While the constitutional contours of FCA enforcement remain
confusing, judicial precedent offers a framework under which
these issues eventually may be clarified. More troubling, however,
are the fundamental fairness issues raised by permitting the
litigation process to be used to make substantive legal
265

Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (reversing the panel’s decision that the qui tam provisions violated the
Take Care Clause and separation of powers principles).
266
Id. at 751 (relating procedural history).
267
United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 982 F. Supp.
1261, 1268-69 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
268
Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999).
269
Id.
270
Riley, 252 F. 3d at 749. The district court subsequently dismissed the
qui tam claims, see United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp.,
200 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002), but they were reinstated by the Fifth
Circuit. See United States ex. rel Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d
370 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui
Tam, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 381, 437 (arguing that “dispersal of power among the
citizens,” unlike the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another, is
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine).
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determinations in the absence of traditional legislative and
regulatory rulemaking procedures. In the health care fraud context,
these concerns center on one particular phenomenon: the fact that
the vast majority of such cases settle, rather than proceeding to
trial.271
The enormous potential liability under the Act, which includes
not only tremendous civil penalties but also the specter of
exclusion from federal health care programs, convinces many
health care providers to settle FCA allegations for more reasonable
sums plus the government’s agreement not to pursue exclusion.272
As health economist Uwe Reinhardt has noted, “[r]ather than
engaging in a long, protracted fight to set the record straight,
throughout which share prices suffer and business slumps, a health
company’s best bet may simply be to hand over the fines and get
on with business.”273
While settlements may be preferable from the perspective of
the parties involved in the litigation, they may not benefit the
industry as a whole. To the extent settlement removes many factual
and legal issues from judicial scrutiny, it may preclude a health
care provider from arguing a range of issues that are crucial to the
development of health care regulatory policy.274 The result of such
271

See Aussprung, supra note 37, at 3.
See Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1413 (arguing that
settlements permit unchecked prosecutorial discretion); Aussprung, supra note
37, at 3 (noting “only a small minority of health care fraud and abuse cases go to
trial”); supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (explaining the astronomical
penalties that may be imposed under the FCA). This appears to be part of a
broader trend in civil litigation. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial,
A.B.A.J., Oct. 2002, at 24 (discussing the decline in number of federal trials and
the increase in settlements and alternative dispute mechanisms).
273
Reinhardt, supra note 7. See also William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse
Law, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1179, 1180 (1999) (noting that “large
organizations have such a large stake in avoiding exclusion from Medicare that
they readily settle pending charges, making much of fraud control resemble a
rebate program more than a law enforcement exercise”); Hyman, Health Care
Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 552 (arguing that “the FCA makes it
possible for the government and qui tam relators to extract the equivalent of
greenmail as a discount off list price”).
274
As one commentator has argued, “many aspects of the law are never
272
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settlements is an unofficial body of law comprised of legally
untested theories of falsity and fraud—an amorphous body of
quasi-legal guidance with no precedential value, but on which the
government will nevertheless rely in future enforcement efforts.275
Admittedly, not all such settlements are equally troublesome.
Many settlements dispose of purely factual issues, such as the truth
or falsity of the claims submitted. For example, if a physician
settles accusations that she “upcoded” bills by charging for a more
expensive category of services than was rendered, the physician
clearly will sacrifice her ability to prove that some of the
challenged codes were in fact accurate.276 Although many
settlement agreements make clear that the defendant is not
admitting liability, it is equally clear that by settling, the defendant
has waived the right to contest the truth of the government’s
allegations.277 While the result might strike us as unfair if the
government’s accusations lacked any evidentiary basis, the
decision to settle these factual disputes is a strategic one based on
whether the defendant wants to incur the time and expense of a
trial.278
litigated and never face the winnowing effects of judicial scrutiny.” Sarah A.
Klein, False Claims Act: Protection or Persecution? AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 15,
1999, at 6. Cf. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 873, 926-27
(urging increased judicial oversight of agency consent decrees); Waller, supra
note 175, at 1413 (decrying the “long-standing trend in which the courts appear
to focus more on the enforcement of the private bargain reached by the parties
rather than engage in a meaningful review of the public interest aspects of the
private bargain itself” in the antitrust context).
275
See Aussprung, supra note 37, at 1 (describing settlements as “a de facto
body of health care fraud and abuse law”).
276
Cf. Bucy, supra note 34, at 6 (describing a University of Pennsylvania
PATH settlement based, in part, on allegations of upcoding for services rendered
by physicians on the medical school faculty).
277
See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Baptist Med. Ctr., Settlement
Agreement, Oct. 10, 1999, reprinted in HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE REP. (CCH)
¶ 130,318 (noting that “the Hospital by executing this Agreement does not admit
to any liability or wrongdoing”).
278
See id. at ¶ 130,318 (“The United States and the Hospital disagree on
whether any of the Claims described . . . might qualify as ‘false claims’ . . . .
However, to avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of litigation, the parties
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What is more troubling, at least to this author, are situations in
which the settlement process is used to circumvent judicial review
of legal theories of falsity, fraud, or other elements of the law. For
example, defining the requisite elements of falsity and intent under
the FCA has proven to be a complicated task for the judiciary, at
times resulting in inconsistent opinions.279 At trial, this ambiguity
offers the defendant an opportunity to try to persuade the judge
that its interpretation of the rules was correct, or at least constituted
a good faith error. As commentators have noted, however,
“[w]hether or not a provider who innocently misconstrues a
complex regulation would ever actually be found guilty in a court
of law is in some ways moot if the provider cannot risk putting the
issue of its culpability to the trier of fact.”280 Recent enforcement
efforts offer many examples of this phenomenon, but two will
suffice: (a) the “bootstrapping” of regulatory violations into a basis
for FCA liability; and (b) the recent debate over the prices the
Medicare program pays for prescription drugs.
a. FCA Liability Based on Regulatory Violations
As noted above, a major FCA dispute concerns whether the
law can be used as a vehicle for allegations that the defendant has
violated other legal provisions pertaining to the federal health care
programs—provisions that do not themselves provide private
rights of action.281 For several years, federal prosecutors and qui
tam relators have invoked the FCA in situations where health care
services were delivered to patients as claimed, but where the
provider may have violated underlying legal requirements (such as
the anti-referral laws) in furnishing the care.282 Although there are
few reported opinions on the merits of these allegations, several
courts appear sympathetic to the proposition that a violation of the
have agreed to settle the matter.”).
279
See Krause, supra note 49, at 151-58 (discussing the judiciary’s
tendency to confuse the elements of the FCA cause of action).
280
Jost & Davies, supra note 53, at 265.
281
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
282
See Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1391-1406
(discussing FCA cases).
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Anti-Kickback or Stark provisions may render subsequent claims
for legitimate health care services per se false.283
Not all courts have accepted this argument. In United States ex
rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, the Fifth Circuit
rejected such per se allegations, limiting FCA suits to situations
involving the false certification of compliance with relevant
laws.284 As the court noted, “where the government has
conditioned payment of a claim upon certification of compliance
with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a
false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies
compliance with that statute or regulation.”285 Under this approach,
liability will hinge on whether certification of compliance with the
relevant legal provisions truly is a condition of payment—often a
difficult proposition to prove with regard to the federal health care
programs.286
283

See id. (describing cases); United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F.
Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding the relator “could produce
evidence that would show that the kickbacks allegedly paid to the defendant
physicians somehow tainted the claims for Medicare”); United States ex rel.
Pogue v. American Healthcorp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1509 (M.D. Tenn.
1996) (noting that “[a] recent trend of cases appear to support [the] proposition
that a violation of Medicare anti-kickback and self-referral laws also constitutes
a violation of the False Claims Act”). In a later proceeding after the Pogue
allegations were transferred as part of multidistrict litigation, the district court
affirmed the validity of these basic allegations. See United States ex. rel. Pogue
v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. Of America, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263-66
(D.D.C. 2002) (upholding validity of theory).
284
125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that “claims for services
rendered in violation of a statute do not necessarily constitute false or fraudulent
claims under the FCA”). See also United States ex. rel. Barmak v. Sutter Corp.,
No. 95 CIV.7637 KTD RLE, 2002 WL 987109 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002), at *56 (rejecting the argument “that a violation of the anti-kickback statute is ipso
facto a violation of the FCA,” and noting the lack of causal relation between the
alleged violations and the submission of claims); Krause, supra note 49, at 17581 (discussing the certification approach).
285
125 F.3d at 902 (emphasis added).
286
Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58. As the author previously
has argued, claims submitted in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute are not
automatically “statutorily ineligible for payment,” as some commentators posit.
Id. at 1394 (disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion on remand in United
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A few years later, the Fifth Circuit appeared to retreat from its
focus on express certification. In United States v. Southland Mgt.
Corp., the owners of a low-income housing project were accused
of misrepresenting the condition of apartments subsidized by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).287 The
government argued that the defendants’ payment vouchers falsely
certified that the units were in “decent, safe, and sanitary
condition,” despite the fact that repeated inspections had
documented numerous deficiencies.288 HUD, however, continued
to pay the vouchers while negotiating a corrective action plan.289
Given HUD’s knowledge of the true conditions of the premises,
the district court held that the misrepresentations obviously were
not material to the agency’s decision to disburse funds to the
defendants.290
While acknowledging that the FCA contains a materiality
requirement, a panel of the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district
court’s reliance on how HUD factually handled the claims.291
Instead, the court cited Thompson for the proposition that
materiality is to be judged by the legal requirements of the statute,
noting that the “disposition of this claim clearly indicates that if a
certification of compliance with a statute or regulation is a
States ex. rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Health Care Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d
1017, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1998)). Failure to comply with the Anti-Kickback Statute
does not necessarily lead to either non-payment or expulsion from federal health
care programs. Id.
287
288 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002).
288
Id. at 673.
289
Id.
290
95 F. Supp. 2d 629 (S.D. Miss. 2000). Moreover, the district court
suggested the government’s prior knowledge of the defendants’ activities could
preclude a finding of falsity and/or intent. Id. at 643.
[B]ecause the defendants were fully apprised of HUD’s awareness of
the problems at the apartments which now form the basis of the
Government’s suit, and in fact, corresponded with HUD with respect to
those very same problems, there can simply be no reasonable finding
that defendants “knowingly” made a false statement or claim to HUD
regarding the condition of the property.
Id.
291
Southland Mgt. Corp., 288 F.3d at 695.
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prerequisite to the defendant’s legal entitlement to funds, the
certification is a material misrepresentation and renders the claim
false as a matter of law.”292 To the extent the court focused on the
language of the statute and regulations in the abstract, rather than
the government’s actual payment procedures, litigants feared one
avenue of FCA defense had been foreclosed.293
In April 2003, however, after rehearing the case en banc, the
Fifth Circuit issued a new opinion upholding the district court’s
judgment for the defendant property owners.294 This time, the
court’s inquiry focused on the language of the agreement in
question.295 Noting that the contract permitted HUD to undertake a
variety of remedial actions against owners who failed to comply
with program regulations, the court held that “[d]uring the
corrective action period . . . claims for housing assistance
payments are not false claims because they are claims for money to
which the Owners are entitled (and which provide the wherewithal
both to operate the property and to take the necessary corrective
actions).”296 In essence, the en banc opinion returned the focus to
the government’s actual payment decision rather than an abstract
reading of the program requirements, suggesting that defendants
should have an opportunity to prove their alleged
misrepresentations were not truly material to the government’s
payment decision and hence not actionable under the FCA.
Although much of the controversy thus far has centered on

292

Id. at 679 (emphasis added). According to the dissent, the majority’s
interpretation of this novel “claim materiality” requirement was “ingenious but
wrong.” See id. at 693 (Jones, J., dissenting). See also Krause, supra note 49, at
188-201 (discussing FCA materiality requirement).
293
Southland Mgt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665.
294
United States v. Southland Mgt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2003).
295
Id.
296
Id. at 676. In a separate concurrence, Judge Jones objected to the
majority’s reliance on the contract terms, arguing that the case should have been
affirmed because: (1) the defendants’ certifications were not material to HUD’s
payment decision; and (2) the defendants could not “knowingly” have submitted
false claims because the government was fully aware of the condition of the
property. Id. at 678 (Jones, J., concurring). In her words, “[t]he government got
exactly what it was willing to pay for.” Id.
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attempts to base FCA suits on violations of the anti-referral
provisions, the more significant long-term impact of this approach
may result from its application in the quality-of-care context.
Health care providers, particularly institutions, must satisfy a wide
range of highly technical conditions for participation in the federal
health care programs.297 Failure to satisfy these conditions will
subject the provider to a variety of sanctions, including civil
penalties and possible program exclusion.298 Recently, the
government and qui tam relators have argued that a request for
payment submitted when the provider is out of compliance with
any of these standards should be considered “false or fraudulent”
under the FCA, even if the underlying noncompliance likely would
not lead to any significant sanctions by program administrators.299
One of the first uses of this approach occurred in United States
ex. rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers, in which a
psychiatric hospital was accused of failing to provide Medicaid
patients with the “reasonably safe environment” required by
federal law.300 The government argued that by billing Medicaid for
patient care services, the hospital had implicitly and untruthfully
certified that it was in compliance with all program-related quality
requirements.301 The district court agreed this could be a viable
297

See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pt. 482 (2003) (describing the “conditions of
participation” for hospitals).
298
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.406 (2003) (identifying remedies that may be
imposed when long-term care facility fails to comply with conditions of
participation).
299
See Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal
False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry,
51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 123 (1999).
[T]hese conditions are not conditions of payment. To the contrary, the
relevant Medicare regulations make clear that if a condition of
participation is not satisfied, the provider is not excluded from the
program, and payment is not stopped unless the HCFA determines that
an immediate threat to the health or safety of patients exists.
Id.
300
945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (alleging that the environment
was not “reasonably safe” because patients suffered physical injury and sexual
abuse).
301
Id. at 1487.
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theory of falsity and denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss,
noting that the Medicaid law and regulations mandated compliance
with certain quality standards.302
Similar allegations were made in United States v. NHC
Healthcare Corp., in which the government argued that the
defendant nursing home “was so severely understaffed that it could
not possibly have administered all of the care it was obligated to
perform” for federal health care program patients.303 The district
court held that this approach required the government to prove
“that the patients were not provided the quality of care which
promotes the maintenance and the enhancement of the quality of
life,” as required by the Medicare and Medicaid programs.304
Citing Aranda, the court found that the FCA applied to the
submission of claims for services not actually performed, and
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.305
Federal prosecutors have invoked this theory more broadly
against nursing homes that allegedly bill the government for
“inadequate” care. Since 1996, the United States Attorneys Office
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has taken the lead in these
cases, negotiating a number of high-profile settlements.306
Although the facilities generally have not admitted any
wrongdoing, common elements of these settlements include the
payment of civil penalties, development of training and oversight
procedures for specific problem areas, third-party monitoring of

302

Id. at 1488. Because the opinion concerned a motion to dismiss, the
court did not have occasion to address whether the plaintiff ultimately would
have prevailed on the merits. For a detailed discussion of the implied
certification approach, as contrasted with the explicit certification and per se
approaches, see Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1392-1406.
303
115 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
See, e.g., David R. Hoffman, The Role of the Federal Government in
Ensuring Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L.
147 (1997) (prosecuting attorney’s discussion of United States v. GMS
Management-Tucker, Inc. No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa., settled Feb. 21, 1996));
Northern Health Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md.
1998).
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quality conditions, and adoption of a corporate compliance
program.307 While critics have argued that the inherently subjective
issue of health care “quality” is better addressed through the health
care licensing and disciplinary systems than through fraud
prosecutions, quality of care clearly has become one of the
government’s top fraud enforcement priorities.308 As the OIG
warned in its Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing
Facilities, “knowingly billing for nonexistent or substandard care,
items, or services” may be actionable under the FCA.309 Thus,
despite the lack of case law on the merits of these disputes, the
FCA successfully has been used to negotiate settlements based on
regulatory violations.
The consequences of using the litigation approach in this
context are significant. In both the anti-referral and quality-of-care
contexts, plaintiffs have successfully utilized FCA litigation to
circumvent the normal adjudicative processes for determining
whether an underlying violation has occurred and what sanctions
may be appropriate.310 When the suits are brought by the
government, this strategy allows prosecutors to negotiate a
favorable resolution of the allegations without proving that a
violation actually occurred. Of course, to the extent a settlement
primarily benefits patients, it is difficult to argue that the result is
anything but a success. But when the suit is brought by a private
party under the FCA qui tam provision, the result is somewhat
different: the circumvention of the standard regulatory appeals
process results in the diversion of some part of the proceeds into
the pockets of private individuals, rather than into the Medicare
307

See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 306, at 154-55.
See Fabrikant & Solomon, supra note 299, at 160-61 (arguing that a
more appropriate remedy is to strengthen federal and state regulatory agency
oversight of such institutions).
309
Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing
Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14289, 14295 n.49 (March 16, 2000).
310
See Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations
Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against
Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 94 (1999) (noting that
when medical necessity disputes are handled through the administrative appeals
process, rather than the FCA, health care providers often prevail).
308
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Trust Fund or the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account.
In such circumstances, the benefit to patients is reduced
significantly.
b. Drug Pricing Issues
Another example of the use of FCA litigation to address
regulatory ambiguity concerns the prescription drug industry,
which has been under considerable scrutiny in recent years. In the
past, the majority of this attention focused on drug sales and
marketing practices, which potentially implicate the Anti-Kickback
Statute.311 As the OIG noted in a 1994 Special Fraud Alert on
Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes:
Traditionally, physicians and pharmacists have been trusted
to provide treatments and recommend products in the best
interest of the patient. In an era of aggressive drug
marketing, however, patients may now be using
prescription drug items, unaware that their physician or
pharmacist is compensated for promoting the selection of a
specific product.312
Because drug manufacturers do not submit bills directly to the
federal health care programs, but rather sell their products to
physicians, pharmacists, and patients, it has been difficult to reach
these companies under traditional false billing theories. However,
the recent extension of the exclusion sanction to include entities
that indirectly furnish items and services to federal health care
program beneficiaries has markedly strengthened the government’s
negotiating position relative to drug manufactures.313
In addition to their sales and marketing practices, prescription
drug companies have come under scrutiny for allegedly inflating
the prices paid for their products by the federal health care
311

See generally Bulleit & Krause, supra note 68.
Office of the Inspector Gen., Special Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug
Marketing Schemes (Aug. 1994), reprinted in Publication of OIG Special Fraud
Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,376 (Dec. 19, 1994).
313
See 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10 (2003); supra notes 86-87 and accompanying
text.
312
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programs, particularly Medicare.314 As of December 2003,
Medicare generally reimbursed physicians on the basis of (i) their
actual charges or (ii) 95 percent of the “Average Wholesale Price”
(AWP) for drugs they administer in the office setting.315
Unfortunately, the Medicare statute and regulations did not define
this “average” price. Instead, the Medicare contractors based their
calculations on information contained in pharmaceutical pricing
publications and databases, which in turn received information
directly from the manufacturers.316 There is widespread agreement
that the published prices do not reflect the actual price at which
many physicians are able to purchase these products, due to
volume discounts and other purchasing incentives.317 Thus,
reliance on published AWP may result in payments that are
significantly higher than what many physicians actually pay for the
drug, resulting in a nice profit—or “kickback”—when the
physician is reimbursed.318
314

See Paul E. Kalb et al., The Average Wholesale Price: It “Ain’t What
the Government Wants to Pay”, 5 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 182
(2001).
315
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395u(o)(1) & 13951(a)(1)(s) (2003). Medicare generally
does not cover self-administered outpatient prescription drugs, such as pills. Id.
§ 1395x(s)(2)(A) (excluding coverage). Despite this significant limitation,
preliminary estimates are that the program spent $8.4 billion on prescription
drugs in 2002. See Medicare Program; Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68
Fed. Reg. 50428, 50429 (Aug. 20, 2003) (citing statistics).
316
John K. Iglehart, Medicare and Drug Pricing, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1590, 1591 (2003).
317
Id.
318
See Kalb, supra note 314. Similarly, the Medicaid pricing provisions are
notoriously complex. In brief, payment for single-source drugs may not exceed
the lower of the estimated acquisition cost plus a reasonable dispensing fee, or
the usual or customary charge. 42 C.F.R. § 447.331(b) (2003). Within these
limits, states may develop their own reimbursement methodologies, which often
are based on discounted AWP. See STATE MEDICAID MANUAL § 6305.1.B
(stating that AWP, without a “significant” discount, is no longer an acceptable
price estimate). In addition, the state Medicaid programs receive rebates from
drug manufacturers, based on the greater of: (a) a statutory minimum
percentage; or (b) the difference between the average price paid by wholesalers
for products distributed for retail trade (“average manufacturer price”) and the
“best price” paid for the product (i.e., the lowest price actually paid by any
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The most famous example of “AWP fraud” to date involved
TAP Pharmaceutical Products, which in October 2001 agreed to
pay a record $875 million dollars to settle a variety of civil and
criminal fraud allegations stemming from the sale of its cancer
drug Lupron.319 The government alleged that TAP knowingly
reported AWP information that was significantly higher than
Lupron’s true average sales price, thus assuring Medicare
reimbursement would remain artificially high.320 Of course, this
strategy did not directly translate into higher revenues for TAP:
because the company does not sell its products directly to the
Medicare program, it could not directly reap the benefits of the
inflated price.321 So the government further alleged that TAP
“marketed the spread” between the discounted prices paid by its
physician customers and the artificially high Medicare
reimbursement—thus offering its customers a financial inducement
to prescribe Lupron in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, and
potentially implicating the FCA.322 Moreover, by concealing the
true pricing structure from Medicare and falsely advising its
customers to report AWP rather than the actual price of the drug,
TAP allegedly caused its customers to submit false claims.323
Settlement of the FCA allegations accounted for approximately
$560 million of TAP’s total payment, and disposed of two separate
qui tam cases against the company.324
purchaser for the product, with the exception of certain government purchases).
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1) (2003).
319
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3. A consortium of
patients and health plans are also pursuing civil actions for damages based on
the company’s pricing activities. See In re: Lupron(R) Marketing & Sales
Practices Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 280 (D. Mass. 2003) (denying in part and
allowing in part the parent company’s motion to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction).
320
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3. TAP also pleaded
guilty to a conspiracy to violate sections 331 and 353 of the Prescription Drug
Marketing Act of 1987 by selling drug samples, and paid a $290 million
criminal fine. Id. The qui tam suits included a suit filed by TAP’s former Vice
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Perhaps the greatest surprise surrounding the TAP case—aside
from the magnitude of the settlement—was the fact that AWP
problems had long been a matter of common knowledge. For the
past thirty years, the federal government has been aware that
published AWP does not reflect the actual price paid for many
prescription drugs. As early as 1974, the government sought to
limit the prices paid to pharmacists under the Medicaid program,
noting that “the published prices overstate[] the actual prices paid
by pharmacists by an average of 15 to 18 [percent].”325 Similarly,
in revising the Medicare physician payment methodology in 1991,
HHS noted that “the Red Book and other wholesale price guides
substantially overstate the true cost of drugs.”326 A series of reports
by the OIG and GAO in the 1990s further illustrated the problem,
concluding that physicians were able to purchase these products at
significant discounts from AWP.327
Prior to late 2003, longstanding recognition of the problem had
led to several failed legislative and regulatory attempts to revise
the Medicare drug reimbursement methodology.328 In 2000, for
example, HCFA sent a memorandum to the Medicare contractors
announcing an “alternative” source of AWP information developed
by the DOJ and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud
President of Sales, who claimed to have quit because of his concerns about the
company’s sales and marketing practices, and a suit filed by a urologist
employed by one of TAP’s HMO customers, who reported that he had been
offered an “educational grant” if he agreed to reverse the HMO’s decision to
cover one of Lupron’s less-expensive competitors. Id. The whistleblowers
received approximately $95 million of the proceeds. Id.
325
Proposed Regulations Limiting Drug Costs, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,302 (Nov.
15, 1974).
326
Dep’t Health & Human Services, Medicare Program: Fee Schedule for
Physicians’ Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,792, 25,800 (proposed June 5, 1991).
327
See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: PAYMENTS FOR
COVERED OUTPATIENT DRUGS EXCEED PROVIDERS’ COSTS, GAO-01-1118
(Sept. 2001), at 4 (estimating that physicians are able to purchase most
Medicare-covered drugs at average discounts of 13 to 34 percent off of AWP,
with some discounts running as high as 65 to 86 percent).
328
See CMS, Medicare Program; Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68
Fed. Reg. 50428, 50429 (proposed Aug. 20, 2003) (describing the history of
payment methodology).
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Control Units.329 Two months later, HCFA instructed the
contractors not to use the new data, noting that “congressional
action may preclude the use of this alternative source.”330
Similarly, when Congress revisited the payment methodology in
1997, consensus could only be achieved to reduce payment to 95
percent of AWP—an amount clearly insufficient to offset the 13 to
34 percent actual discounts discussed above.331
The reasons for these failures have been mostly political. Most
significantly, efforts to revise drug payments have encountered
strong opposition from the powerful oncology lobby, which has
argued that the higher reimbursement reflected in the “spread” is
needed to subsidize the special costs of storing and administering
oncology drugs.332 Recent reports have suggested that there is

329

See Program Memorandum AB-00-86 from Department of Health and
Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration (Sept. 8, 2000),
available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/pm_trans/AB0086.pdf. See also, e.g.,
Grant Bagley et al., The Bayer CIA: A Glimpse Into the Future of
Pharmaceutical Reimbursements?, 5 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 330,
332-33 (Apr. 18, 2001) (describing unsuccessful attempts to use revised,
government-generated AWP data for certain drugs).
330
Program Memorandum AB-00-115 from Department of Health and
Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration (Nov. 17, 2000),
available
at
http://
www.cms.gov/manuals/pm_trans/AB00115.pdf;
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, §
429 (imposing moratorium on administrative decreases in drug reimbursement
rates until completion of GAO study of current payment methodology). In
August 2003, CMS reopened the issue by publishing a notice in the Federal
Register proposing to revise the drug payment methodology by one of four
approaches: (a) enforcing “comparability” between prices paid by contractors
for drugs for their Medicare and private policyholders; (b) applying a greater
AWP discount; (c) setting prices based on increased market monitoring; and (d)
establishing a competitive acquisition program for drugs. Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services, Medicare Program; Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68
Fed. Reg. 50428 (proposed Aug. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405).
Due to subsequent legislative activity, however, the future of the CMS
provisions is unclear. See infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
331
See Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4556(a), 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1395u(o)(1)); supra note 327.
332
See Iglehart, supra note 316, at 182 (describing the oncology
community’s opposition to reform efforts).

KRAUSE6.DOC

128

3/8/2004 12:57 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

indeed a problem with the current oncology practice expense
methodology.333 Under Medicare’s general budget-neutral
approach to practice expenses, however, increasing oncologists’
reimbursement would have required an equivalent reduction in
payments for other types of specialists.334 Faced with the wrath of
the oncology lobby if drug reimbursement were reduced—and the
wrath of other powerful physicians’ groups if oncologists’
reimbursements were increased at their own expense—turning a
blind eye to the AWP loophole may have been the most palatable
alternative.
Given this historical context, two aspects of the TAP case stand
out. First, it is somewhat disingenuous to accuse a company of
committing fraud when it takes advantage of a well-known
loophole in current law—a loophole there has not yet been the
political will to close. Second, and more important, the DOJ and
HHS essentially used the fraud settlement process as a means of
closing that loophole, at least with respect to TAP’s products. The
government did this through TAP’s Corporate Integrity
Agreement, which required the company to report the “Average
Sales Price” (ASP) of each of its products on a quarterly basis.335
The ASP is defined as the average of all final sales prices charged
by TAP for each product to all purchasers except (1) direct sales to
hospitals and (2) sales not included in calculating the Medicaid
333

The GAO has agreed that the reimbursement methodology for
oncologists should be revisited. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE
PHYSICIAN FEE SCHEDULE: PRACTICE EXPENSE PAYMENTS TO ONCOLOGISTS
INDICATE NEED FOR OVERALL REFINEMENTS, GAO-02-53 (Oct. 2001).
334
See Iglehart, supra note 316, at 1595 (citing remarks by William J.
Scanlon, director of health care issues for GAO). In the August 2003 Proposed
Rule, CMS indicated its intent to resolve this issue by increasing the practice
expense allocation for drug administration. 68 Fed. Reg. at 50,436-39. To the
extent the payment increases were not offset by the savings from the revised
drug reimbursement methodology, CMS stated that an exception to the budget
neutrality requirement would apply. Id. at 50,439.
335
See Corporate Integrity Agreement Between The Office Of Inspector
General Of The Department Of Health And Human Services And TAP
Pharmaceutical Products Inc., § III.D (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Corporate
Integrity Agreement], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/
tap_pharmaceutical_products_9280l. pdf.
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rebate “best price.”336 The ASP must be net of all volume
discounts, prompt pay discounts, cash discounts, chargebacks,
short-dated products, free goods, rebates, and all other price
concessions, with the exception of bona fide charity care or
grants.337 Thus, the ASP is a far more accurate assessment of the
drug’s average market price than the company-reported AWP.
Clearly, the ASP reporting requirement was intended not only
to track the price of the drugs, but also to permit CMS to alter their
reimbursement. The CIA stated that the pricing information could
be relied upon by CMS in establishing reimbursement rates for
TAP’s products, although CMS could not change the rates without
conducting “meaningful review for all government reimbursed
therapeutically similar products.”338 Prior to late 2003, however,
there appeared to be no authority for CMS to obtain ASP
information from other manufacturers in the Medicare context,
except on a voluntary basis (or pursuant to CIAs negotiated by
other companies facing similar litigation).339 Moreover, to the
extent the Medicare statute at the time mandated reimbursement on
the basis of either actual charges or 95 percent of AWP, it is not
clear that CMS had the authority to change reimbursement on the
basis of ASP information: while ASP may be an average of all
sales, it is not necessarily an estimate of the price paid by an
individual physician, nor is it equivalent to the wholesale price.340
Nonetheless, the CIA was an attempt to accomplish via litigation

336

Id. at § II.D.2.a
Id.
338
Id. at § III.D.2.d. The information may also be used by state Medicaid
programs in establishing reimbursement rates, subject to the provisions of
TAP’s individual state settlement agreements. Id.
339
A number of other pharmaceutical companies are under investigation
for similar practices. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bayer to Pay $14
Million to Settle Claims for Causing Providers to Submit Fraudulent Claims to
45 State Medicaid Programs, Jan. 23, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2001/January/039civ.htm. See also Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater,
New York Will Sue 2 Big Drug Makers on Doctor Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2003, at Al (reporting spokeswoman for Aventis as stating “the company
voluntarily stopped reporting an average wholesale price in August 2001”).
340
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(o)(1) (2003); 42 C.F.R. § 405.517(b) (2003).
337
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something the legislative and regulatory processes had thus far
failed to achieve: a revision of the Medicare drug reimbursement
methodology to more accurately reflect the prices paid by
customers. As one observer has argued, prosecutors “are trying to
use litigation to force companies to change their practices, not just
to win damages.”341
And it was clear that these efforts would not be limited to TAP.
In the subsequent Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, the OIG identified the “Integrity of Data Used to
Establish or Determine Governmental Reimbursement” as one of
the key risk areas for pharmaceutical manufacturers.342 As the
OIG noted, “[t]he government sets reimbursement with the
expectation that the data provided are complete and accurate. The
knowing submission of false, fraudulent, or misleading
information is actionable.”343 Given reports of similar
investigations against many other large pharmaceutical companies,
it was quite possible that the OIG would be able to use the CIA
process to induce pricing changes for many of the products
reimbursed by the Medicare program—thus, as a practical matter,
facilitating the underlying goal without resorting to contentious
legal or regulatory actions.344
These suspicions were borne out in December 2003, when
Congress finally passed the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.345 Under the new
legislation, reimbursement for outpatient prescription drugs in
2004 generally will be set at 85 percent of AWP, subject to
adjustments based on market surveys.346 Beginning in 2005,
341

See Abelson & Glater, supra note 339 (quoting law professor Jennifer

Arlen).
342

OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,733 (May 5, 2003) (identifying key risk areas).
343
Id. at 23,733.
344
See, e.g., TAP Pharmaceuticals, Bristol-Myers Squibb Targets of
Federal Marketing, Pricing Probe, 4 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 207
(2001) (describing investigations against other large pharmaceutical companies).
345
Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 303, 117 Stat. 2066, 2233 (2003) (“Payment
Reform for Covered Outpatient Drugs and Biologicals”).
346
Id. at § 303(b)(2), 117 Stat. 2238-39 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
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payment for single-source drugs will be based on the lesser of: (1)
the “average sales price,” which is defined broadly to include sales
to all purchasers except certain “nominal” sales and those
exempted from the Medicaid best price determination; or (2) the
“wholesale acquisition cost” (WAC), which is defined as the
manufacturer’s list price to wholesalers and direct purchasers.347
The OIG will be required to conduct surveys to monitor the market
prices of drugs, and reimbursement may be adjusted accordingly;
manufacturers who misrepresent a drug’s average sales price will
be subject to civil monetary penalties, as well as FCA liability.348
Beginning in 2006, physicians will also have the option to obtain
outpatient drugs through a competitive acquisition system.349 In
order to address the oncology issues mentioned above, the drug
pricing revisions are explicitly linked to an increase in practice
expense reimbursement for drug administration, with such
revisions exempted from the budget neutrality requirement.350
It is far too soon to determine whether the new provisions will
resolve this long-standing debate. Despite the practice expense
revisions, oncologists have already complained that the post-2005
reimbursement
methodology
will
disadvantage
them
economically.351 Moreover, the complexity of both the pricing and
1395u(o)(4)).
347
Id. at § 303(c), 117 Stat. 2239-42 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w3a(b)(4), (c)). Moreover, the definition of average sales price is similar to the
definition of ASP found in the TAP CIA. Id.; Corporate Integrity Agreement,
supra note 335, at § II.D.2.d.
348
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 303(c), 117 Stat. 2243-44 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(d)). H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-391, at 592 (2003) (“The
Conferees intend that if a manufacturer knowingly . . . submits false
information, that such information be considered a ‘false record or statement’
made or used ‘to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
government’ for purposes of” the FCA.).
349
Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 303(d), 117 Stat. 2245-52 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-3B).
350
Id. at §§ 303(a), 117 Stat. 2234-37, 2253 (providing for practice expense
adjustments), (f) (prohibiting the Secretary of HHS from revising drug payment
amounts in 2004 unless concurrent practice expense adjustments are made).
351
See, e.g., Darrin Schlegel, US Oncology Says Medicare Changes Threat
to Profits, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3, 2003, at Business, p. 1.
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the practice expense revisions is likely to require extensive
rulemaking by CMS, which—similar to other anti-fraud initiatives
described in this article—may result in an unanticipated delay in
implementation. For our purposes, however, it is significant that
both these legislative changes and the most recent round of
proposed regulatory amendments came about only after the widely
publicized AWP fraud investigations and settlements demonstrated
that the issue could be resolved. In this way, the litigation process
not only foreshadowed, but in many ways provided a model for,
the necessary statutory and regulatory changes.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT REGIME
A. Regulatory Ambiguity and Prosecutorial Discretion
The resolution of regulatory ambiguity through selective
litigation might not be of concern if all parties trusted the process
to be fair. Unfortunately, the health care industry has alleged that
the potential for astronomical FCA liability, combined with the
threat of exclusion from federal health care programs, leaves
providers virtually no choice but to settle disputes in which they
might well prevail at trial. As one author has argued, “[p]roviders
who believe they are blameless are under tremendous pressure to
settle, because of the legal expenses associated with mounting a
defense, and the high probability of bankruptcy and professional
disgrace if the jury does not see things the same way the provider
does.”352 Provider organizations have gone further, characterizing
recent fraud enforcement initiatives as “border[ing] on
extortion.”353 There is indeed some evidence to support these
complaints, including a GAO report concluding that the United
States Attorneys’ Offices participating in the “Operation Bad
352

Hyman, supra note 1, at 155. See also id. at 166 (arguing that “settling
these cases, at almost any price, became the only viable option” for hospitals
targeted by the PATH initiative).
353
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, [Untitled Report], B-279893 (July 22,
1998), at 15 n.30 (describing comments made by the Louisiana Hospital
Association).
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Bundle” laboratory initiative had no evidentiary basis for targeting
the hospitals they selected for investigation.354 And even the
courts have acknowledged that the government’s enforcement
efforts have, on occasion, been “rather draconian.”355
That regulators wield significant power to encourage
settlements—even in situations in which abstract legal analysis
might favor the defendant—is not a novel proposition.
Administrative law scholars have long acknowledged that, where
not constrained by judicial review, the balance of power favors the
government in settlement negotiations.356 As one commentator
notes, “the agency possesses the ability to impose its will on the
firm in ways which may not be authorized by the governing
statute, may not have been envisioned by the creators of the
agency, and indeed may exceed the agency’s formal powers.”357
Characterizing the process as “administrative arm-twisting,”
another commentator argues that the practice “succeeds, and
evades judicial or other scrutiny, in part because companies in
pervasively regulated industries believe that they cannot afford to
resist agency demands.”358
In addition to raising concerns about fairness to the industry,359
this approach also promotes a form of “regulation by litigation”—
the agency’s ability to demand compliance with conditions of
participation that are not required, and perhaps not permitted,
under current law. This danger arises under any enforcement
scheme that permits the ex ante imposition of negotiated
conditions before a regulated entity is permitted to participate (or
354

See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: DOJ’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE IN NATIONAL INITIATIVES
VARIES, GAO/HEHS-99-170 (Aug. 1999), at 4 (analyzing investigations);
Hyman, supra note 1, at 165-66 (describing laboratory bundling investigations).
355
Ass’n. of Am. Med. Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that the “OIG could still modify its rather draconian view of the
[Medicare] Act’s requirements for Part B billing”).
356
See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 8; Noah, supra note 274.
357
Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1299.
358
Noah, supra note 274, at 922.
359
See Krause, supra note 49, at 210-12 (describing the importance of fair
FCA enforcement to the perceived legitimacy of the anti-fraud agenda).
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in this case to continue participating) in the relevant market:
The basic substantive concern . . . is that agencies and
agency personnel will use the relatively unfettered
authority they enjoy . . . in order to coerce compliance from
regulated entities with substantive rules and interpretations
which are of their own creation and are inconsistent with
the norms laid out by the legislature or the courts.360
Of course, the bare fact that an administrative agency interprets (or
even makes) law is not improper; indeed, the whole of
administrative law is predicated on the premise that agency
expertise is necessary to give meaning to the broad laws passed by
Congress.361 Moreover, the ability of an administrative agency to
make law via means other than the traditional notice-and-comment
or adjudicatory processessuch as through informal guidelines,
advisory opinions, and public statements by agency officials—has
been well-documented.362 The use of such informal processes,
however, necessarily means that a great deal of agency lawmaking
takes place outside the established process for judicial review of
administrative actions.363 This is particularly troubling in light of
the fact that courts often defer to the positions expressed by the
agency in such informal guidance.364 The above discussion
360

Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1304.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory
mandate).
362
See, e.g., Waller, supra note 175, at 1404-05 (describing the
development of antitrust guidelines); Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1304-05
(describing the scope of delegated rulemaking authority).
363
See Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1304-05 (noting that traditional
rulemaking and adjudicatory processes occur in the context of judicial review,
whereas “coerc[ed] . . . compliance [occurs] in a context where outside
supervision is lacking”); Noah, supra note 274, at 936-37 (arguing that “[t]he
opportunity to challenge agency action in court provides a critical deterrent to
arbitrary action”).
364
See, e.g., Waller, supra note 175, at 1407-08 (noting that courts defer to
the antitrust guidelines); Zimmer, Inc. v. Nu-Tech Med., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d
850, 862 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (agreeing with an OIG Advisory Opinion that found
that an arrangement potentially violated the Anti-Kickback Statute); supra Part
III.B.2.
361
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suggests that all of these concerns may be present in current health
care fraud enforcement.
Similar concerns arise with regard to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion outside the regulatory context, such as
with the DOJ’s enforcement of the FCA in health care cases. Given
the broad contours of the FCA and Anti-Kickback Statute, perhaps
the extent of prosecutorial innovation in health care should not be
surprising. As Charles Ruff once noted, “[l]ike Nature, the federal
prosecutor abhors a vacuum. Given a statutory grant of
jurisdiction, he will seek to bring within it any offense he finds
unattended or even, in his view, inadequately attended.”365
Congress is incapable of predicting all situations in which a new
law may be invoked; instead, it enacts broad prohibitions which
“are brought into contact with the real world only through the
mediation of intricate judge-made doctrines that specify what these
laws actually prohibit.”366 Where a statute leaves room for
interpretation as to the prohibited conduct, as with the anti-fraud
statutes, prosecutors will be motivated to “bring previously
undefined conduct to trial in the hope that the court will
criminalize it.”367 But while prosecutors play a necessary role in
interpreting broad statutes, they must take care not to undertake the
heart of the legislative function: defining the contours of prohibited
public behavior.368
Although understandable from the perspective of law
enforcement, this process proves to be less than ideal for providing

365

Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case
Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1228
(1977).
366
Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996). As Kahan notes, “[t]o be sure, Congress must
speak before a person can be convicted of a federal crime, but it needn’t say
much of anything when it does.” Id.
367
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:
Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 179 (1994).
368
See Kahan, supra note 366, at 479-81 (explaining why “prosecutors end
up with a significant share of delegated lawmaking authority”); Moohr, supra
note 367, at 179 (noting that in such circumstances, “lawmaking devolves to law
enforcers”).
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notice to potential defendants. As scholars have long
acknowledged, federal prosecutors have strong personal incentives
to apply the law in ways that benefit their personal agendas rather
than the public good.369 Moreover, individual prosecutors may
“internalize the political benefits and externalize the practical and
human costs of adventurous readings of federal criminal law.”370
Nowhere are those costs greater than in disputes over the proper
scope “of statutes that mark the boundary line between socially
desirable and socially undesirable behavior.”371 Health care antifraud statutes mark such a boundary: they protect against improper
financial activities, while at the same time encouraging the
provision of legitimate medical services and providing the
flexibility necessary for the development of more efficient and
higher quality delivery mechanisms. It is precisely in such
circumstances where clear guidance is crucial in order to “avoid
deterring desirable conduct.”372
The danger is that an overemphasis on enforcement may lull
regulators into complacency, where they seek to delay difficult
policy decisions in the hopes that the desired results instead may
be achieved through the litigation process. There is some evidence
that this has occurred in health care. As one judge recently
observed in the nursing home context, “although extensive
regulatory authority exists for punishing unscrupulous facilities,
the Government has increasingly opted for the expedited results of
lawsuits under the FCA’s powerful threats of significant fines,
treble damages, and costly litigation fees.”373 Similarly, the
369

See Kahan, supra note 366, at 486-87 (noting the phenomenon of
“prosecutorial overreaching”).
370
Id. at 487-88.
371
Id. at 485.
372
Hyman, supra note 1, at 539. See also Kahan, supra note 366, at 485
(arguing that “‘fair warning’ or notice” is most important in such situations);
Noah, supra note 274, at 936 (arguing that “reliance on individualized
bargaining undermines consistency and invites the standardless (and largely
unaccountable) exercise of agency discretion”).
373
United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152
(W.D. Mo. 2000). A similar process appears to be underway in the
Environmental Protection Agency, where commentators argue that “[w]ith the
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ongoing pharmaceutical pricing investigations arose after more
than thirty years of government awareness that the Medicare drug
reimbursement system was flawed, during which time neither
Congress nor HCFA/CMS was able to muster the political will to
make the necessary changes.374 From both an academic and a
practical perspective, it is problematic when enforcement is given a
higher priority than clarifying the applicable regulations. So long
as providers feel compelled to settle these allegations, however,
there appears to be little incentive for regulators to make these
necessary, and often controversial, policy revisions.
B. The Role of Private Relators
The fraud enforcement environment is complicated
significantly by the presence of private relators under the FCA,
who are free to bring suit even when the government declines to
pursue the allegations.375 It is one thing to provide government
prosecutors with the discretion to pursue novel interpretations of a
broad statute; it is quite another to permit private individuals to
reap multi-million dollar recoveries by using the FCA to pursue
violations of ambiguous program rules containing no private rights
of action.376 Although the drafters of the 1986 FCA amendments
envisioned qui tam relators as helpful sources of information that
otherwise would not have been available to the government, the
reality has been quite different.377 The Supreme Court has
priority on meeting referral targets and collecting fines, enforcement officials
forego opportunities to assist in diagnosing and solving the technical or
production problems that can lead to noncompliance. This approach to
enforcement robs the regulatory process of important feedback concerning how
well the rules work.” Freeman, supra note 149, at 17.
374
See supra Part III.C.2.b. See also Patrick Hooper, Health Care Fraud
Frenzy: An Exercise in Overzealous Law Enforcement, 1 HEALTH CARE FRAUD
REP. (BNA) 799 (1997) (arguing that “Congress and federal and state agency
policy-makers are delegating by default substantial policy-making authority to
enforcement agencies and prosecutors”).
375
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2003).
376
Cf. Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (decrying the expansion of civil RICO cases by private litigants).
377
See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4, 23 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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acknowledged this, cynically concluding that “qui tam relators
are . . . motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather
than the public good.”378 Critics have argued that the FCA qui tam
provisions undermine prosecutorial discretion by permitting
relators to maintain suits that the government has declined to join,
and by requiring the government to expend significant resources to
review voluminous qui tam filings.379 While prosecutorial
discretion may be an imperfect screen for preventing unjustified
expansion of the FCA, it is infinitely preferable to a bounty system
enforced by private individuals who have no obligation to further
the government’s—or for that matter the patient’s—health care
interests.380
These observations are not unique to the health care industry.
Statutory enforcement by private parties has long been subject to
allegations of abuse. Indeed, the FCA qui tam provisions are now
unique in American law in part because such statutes fell out of
favor in England in the 1600s, “due in large part to abuses by the
informers, such as fraudulent prosecutions and extortion.”381
Indeed, concern over the role of private parties in regulatory

at 5269, 5288 (“Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation
of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the
fraudulent activity.”).
378
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949
(1997).
379
As Professor James Blumstein has argued, permitting such qui tam suits
in the Anti-Kickback context “allows the pursuit of a suit for civil liability
without the restraining influence of a government official’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.” Blumstein, supra note 154, at 218. See also Marsha J.
Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1171,
1185 (1999) (noting that “private enforcers have no incentive to engage in
discretionary nonenforcement” and that false “tips” can be costly because they
consume scarce agency resources).
380
See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Suits as Monitoring
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1825 (1996)
(“While the interests of public enforcement officials may not be perfectly
congruent with taxpayer interests, it is likely that the aims of qui tam relators
and taxpayers also are not invariably congruent.”).
381
Bales, supra note 270, at 386.
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decisionmaking permeates administrative law. As Professor Jody
Freeman has explained:
Private actors exacerbate all of the concerns that make the
exercise of agency discretion so problematic. They are one
step further removed from direct accountability to the
electorate . . . . As nonstate actors, they remain relatively
insulated from the legislative, executive, and judicial
oversights to which agencies must submit . . . . [They] may
pursue different goals and respond to different incentives
than do public agencies, interfering with their capacity to
be as public-regarding as we expect agencies to be.382
Thus, there is a long-standing perception that it is improper for
agencies to delegate substantial enforcement authority to private
entities.
Compelling as it may be, however, this view of agency
authority is far too simplistic. Private parties are given a role in
enforcement precisely because experience has also shown us that
administrative agencies, left to their own devices, are apt to be
“captured by the interests they purport to regulate.”383 As Professor
Spencer Weber Waller has noted, “[p]ublic choice theory suggests
that . . . regulation[] is rarely, if ever, practiced to maximize an
abstract form of the public interest, but rather represents a
battleground for warring private interests.”384 In this context, the
role of private “watchdogs” is crucialas it was in fifteenth
century England, where qui tam provisions first developed to
counter disincentives for government officials to enforce the

382

Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 574 (2000) [hereinafter, Freeman, Private Role]; Kovacic, supra note
380, at 1831-32 (explaining reasons why relators may “attack conduct that is
benign”).
383
Waller, supra note 175, at 1428. Moreover, private relators may be able
to provide “inside information” that the government otherwise might not be able
to obtain. See Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory
World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 940 (2002) (“Complex economic wrongdoing
cannot be detected or deterred effectively without the help of those who are
intimately familiar with it.”).
384
Waller, supra note 175, at 1428.
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property laws.385 The need for public oversight was evident in the
debates surrounding the 1986 FCA amendments, particularly with
regard to the defense industry:
Congress believed that many public officials were active
participants in the corruption and therefore were unlikely to
enforce the law diligently. Congress wanted to give defense
industry functionaries a strong incentive to inform on
fraudulent defense contractors, and create an enforcement
mechanism that was independent of the Department of
Justice officials who often were part of the problem.386
By providing an alternative source of information to supplement
government investigations—and an alternate means of
enforcement to counter government inertia—the qui tam
provisions establish a mechanism for independent assessment of
the government’s enforcement priorities.387 Thus, while private
enforcement may impose significant costs, it also offers muchneeded oversight.388
The dangers of restricting the private role in enforcement can
be illustrated by an all-too-recent example from the securities
industry. During the 1990s, Congress became concerned with the
volume of private securities fraud litigation, which critics
characterized as “scandalous” and “legalized extortion by the
plaintiffs bar.”389 In response, Congress sought to restrict the
primary vehicle through which such private litigation had been
brought: the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which permit “[a]ny person
injured in his business or property” to bring suit for treble
385

Bales, supra note 270, at 386.
Id. at 388.
387
See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 382, at 663-64 (identifying
advantages of private attorneys general); Ferziger & Currell, supra note 379, at
1200 (arguing in favor of properly constructed bounty systems).
388
See Bales, supra note 270, at 430 (arguing that “Congress made the
policy choice, when it passed the FCA, that the benefits of vigorous enforcement
of the laws prohibiting fraud against the government outweigh the drawbacks of
dispersing prosecutorial power among the public”).
389
141 CONG. REC. H.15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (remarks of Rep.
Bliley in favor of overriding presidential veto of legislation).
386
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damages.390 In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA), Congress prohibited civil RICO suits based on
allegations of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.391 While
the amendment was an efficient method of preventing frivolous
suits in the short term, the long-term consequences of abolishing
this mechanism of private oversight of the securities industry did
not become apparent for several years. In hindsight, some
commentators attribute the recent Enron debacle, in part, to the
significant reduction in legal risks faced by auditors and other
“gatekeepers” once such private litigation was no longer
permitted.392 Thus, the health care industry should take a lesson
from the securities industry: in our zeal to level the playing field
for health care providers relative to qui tam relators, we must take
care not to enact similarly counterproductive measures that allow
fraud to flourish undetected, with similarly disastrous
consequences.
C. Reconceptualizing Our Approach to Fraud
As the above discussion demonstrates, the current federal
approach to health care fraud rests on an untenable combination of
regulatory inertia, a proliferation of informal non-binding
guidance, and an increasing amount of public and private
litigation. Yet while deep dissatisfaction within the provider
community is a legitimate concern, we cannot simply foreclose the
litigation route—neither for government officials, nor for the
private relators who both revitalize and complicate the
enforcement process. How, then, can we increase fairness in health
care fraud enforcement, while not sacrificing efficiency?
First and foremost, it is important to clarify key regulatory
390

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2003) (defining RICO remedies).
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 758, Tit. I., § 107 (1995) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2003)) (stating, “no person may rely upon any conduct that
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to
establish a violation” of RICO).
392
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: “Its About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409 (2002) (identifying the PSLRA
as one reason the legal risks for auditors decreased during the 1990s).
391
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“gray areas.” As Professor Dan Kahan has argued:
The law deters a particular form of wrongdoing most
effectively when it prohibits it in clear terms. If a statute
prohibits a particular form of wrongdoing only
ambiguously, some individuals will engage in it either out
of ignorance of the law or in the hope that courts will
resolve the ambiguity in their favor. Ultimately, then, the
best way to prevent the exploitation of a potential loophole
is to close it.393
Recent experience has demonstrated that it is indeed possible to
close regulatory loopholes in the health care context. For example,
Medicare covers only those items and services that are “reasonable
and necessary,” criteria that have been interpreted to preclude
coverage of “experimental or investigational” drugs and devices.394
In 1986, HCFA issued instructions denying coverage for medical
devices that had not been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).395 When the OIG began to investigate
widespread hospital billing for unapproved devices in the mid1990s, a group of hospitals challenged the validity of these
instructions.396 Although the suit was not successful, a
simultaneous lobbying effort persuaded the government to develop
a mechanism for covering a limited group of non-approved devices
that
are
designated
by
the
FDA
as
“non397
experimental/investigational” in nature. Similar clarifications in
regulatory “gray areas,” as may be occurring with pharmaceutical
pricing, would go a long way towards assuaging industry concerns.
Second, even in the absence of regulatory clarification,
393

Kahan, supra note 366, at 493-94.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2003) (reasonable and necessary
criteria); Medicare Part A Intermediary Letter, No. 77-4 (Jan. 1977), reprinted
in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 28,152 (excluding coverage of
experimental or investigational items and services).
395
See, e.g., Medicare Hospital Manual § 260.1, reprinted in Cedars-Sinai
Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 939 F. Supp 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
396
Cedars-Sinai, 939 F. Supp. at 1457.
397
See 42 C.F.R. § 405.201-15 (2003). This category includes low-risk
devices and newer generations of previously approved devices that present only
incremental risks over their predecessors. Id.
394
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prosecutorial discretion should be exercised so as to minimize the
unfairness resulting from fraud investigations based on good faith
interpretations of ambiguous provisions. For example, in the mid1990s, the OIG undertook the nationwide PATH initiative to
investigate whether hospitals had improperly billed for “physician”
services that were actually rendered by interns and residents.398
Although regulations clarified in 1995 that Medicare would pay
only when the attending physician was physically present at the
time services were rendered, hospitals argued that the policy prior
to that time had been unclear.399 HHS eventually admitted that the
standards had “not been consistently and clearly articulated,” and
limited future audits to hospitals in regions where the Medicare
carrier had clearly explained the rules prior to 1993.400 As positive
as this resolution may have been, however, it suffers from a
significant limitation: it does not apply to suits brought by qui tam
relators, who need not abide by the government’s prosecution
decisions.401
Third, as the author has suggested elsewhere, it might be
possible to devise a format in which the critical legal issue—a
398

See generally, Bucy, supra note 34 (describing the initiative). Medicare
Part B pays for patient care services by attending physicians in hospitals; interns
and residents are funded by general graduate medical education payments made
to the hospital under Medicare Part A, and may not bill for services to individual
patients. Id. at 4.
399
See id. at 7-13 (describing the history of HHS guidance on this issue);
42 C.F.R. § 415.172 (2003) (final regulations). The hospitals were so convinced
of the unfairness of the government’s position that they brought suit against
HHS to prevent further enforcement. See Assn. of Am. Med. Coll. v. United
States, 217 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of suit for want of
jurisdiction, but without prejudice).
400
See Letter from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel of HHS, to Jordan J.
Cohen, President of the Association of American Medical Colleges (July 11,
1997) (admitting lack of clarity and limiting future audits), available at
http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/oig711.htm. The OIG later withdrew from
PATH audits at sixteen facilities whose communications with carriers had been
unclear. See Aussprung, supra note 37, at 24.
401
See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 1848 (calling for the DOJ to exercise its
screening function more vigorously “to eliminate erroneous or frivolous suits”
by qui tam relators); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2003) (describing the procedure if
the United States elects not to intervene in the suit).
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novel theory of falsity or fraud—could be tested without subjecting
the defendant to the full range of FCA liability.402 For example, the
parties might stipulate to the scope of liability, such as the number
and value of claims submitted, and agree to test the legal theory in
a bench trial.403 If the judge found the legal theory to be valid, the
defendant would be subject to damages and penalties in the
stipulated amounts. A ruling against the government, on the other
hand, would serve as binding precedent that the defendant had not
violated the FCA. If feasible, such a mechanism could provide
judicial oversight of the theory of falsity, the crucial ingredient
missing from current FCA enforcement. Again, however, this
approach would be of limited utility if it did not apply to qui tam
suits as well as government actions.
Finally, it may be time to rethink the current qui tam incentive
structure, at least as it pertains to health care fraud. The number of
qui tam cases filed since the 1986 amendments suggests that the
drafters’ strategy is working, perhaps better than anyone
anticipated.404 Yet the success of a private bounty system should
be measured by more than just the sheer number of cases filed;
rather, it should be measured by the number of filings that identify
actual fraud. This in turn requires that the incentive structure be
neither too remote to induce participation from insiders, nor so
generous as to tempt them to file meritless suits.
Good informant tips alert an agency to clear violations of
law for which a high monetary penalty can be imposed; the
worst tips alert agencies to actions that appear to be
violations but are not. In these latter cases, the agency
invests enforcement costs, and the defendant incurs defense
costs, to engage in litigation yielding no penalty. These tips
are not just “noise” in the system; they cost the agency

402

See Krause, supra note 49, at 215-16.
A similar approach has been used to avoid litigating thousands of
individual claims in FCA cases. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp.
5 (D.D.C. 1994) (trying FCA case involving eight thousand claims on the basis
of two hundred representative claims for seven representative patients).
404
See FCA Statistics, supra note 61 (stating that in 1998, approximately
two-thirds of qui tam suits involved the federal health care programs).
403
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scarce enforcement resources, driving down the bounty
scheme’s overall efficiency. More troubling, such tips lead
to unwarranted enforcement actions that give rise to the
most well-grounded political objections to bounty schemes
as a whole.405
Commentators suggest that the ideal bounty system is one that
combines a relatively small bounty (such as 3 percent of the
recovery) with a relatively high degree of certainty that the bounty
will be paid.406 While a full discussion of the FCA qui tam
incentive structure is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth
noting that the current system appears to do much the opposite: it
offers extraordinarily high recoveries for a few successful relators,
but leaves the majority with nothing.407 Whether a more targeted
bounty system might relieve provider anxiety without sacrificing
truth and efficiency remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, health care fraud enforcement is flourishing. By
emphasizing that fraud is both a quality and an economic issue—as
in the nursing home context—prosecutors have characterized
enforcement as protecting both beneficiaries and the public fisc.408
Similarly, in the prescription drug context, alleged overpricing has
been characterized as harming both the federal health care
programs and the patients who are responsible for artificially high
copayments.409 This has proven to be powerful rhetoric.
405

Ferziger & Currell, supra note 379, at 1197-98 (describing a model
bounty system).
406
Id.
407
See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3 (describing TAP
relators’ recovery of $95 million); Kovacic, supra note 380, at 1845-46
(objecting to FCA incentives that encourage relators to wait until damages are
significant before filing suit, and noting that “[i]t is unwise to tie the firefighter’s
reward to the total size of the blaze extinguished”); but see Ferziger & Currell,
supra note 379, at 1186 (arguing that several FCA mechanisms exist to deter
“overzealous enforcement”).
408
See supra notes 303-309 and accompanying text.
409
See, e.g., CMS, Medicare Program: Payment Reform for Part B Drugs,
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It seems unlikely that the current Administration will reverse
this trend, even in light of the war against terrorism. The
individuals who have taken the lead in fraud enforcement at the
OIG, the DOJ, and the United States Attorneys’ Offices generally
are not political appointees. At a time of looming budget deficits,
when recent audits still identify $12 billion a year in improper
Medicare payments, the government simply cannot afford to be
“soft” on fraud. Moreover, if the new Medicare prescription drug
program is ever to become a reality, a continued influx of funds
from fraud recoveries (among other sources) is likely to be
needed.410
What will the future hold? This much seems clear: the
pharmaceutical industry is back under scrutiny, not only for its
sales and marketing activities, but also for its drug pricing methods
and sponsorship of medical research.411 Similarly, the quality of
care in nursing homes continues to generate a great deal of
concern, which has been addressed both through traditional
regulatory oversight mechanisms and, more recently, using the
FCA.412 Indeed, the growing reliance on the FCA to enforce
nursing home quality standards may signal the broader use of the
law to address quality concerns in other health care contexts, such
as hospitals and perhaps managed care organizations.413
The conceptual model outlined above suggests that we will
continue to see three separate mechanisms for reducing health care
fraud: traditional notice-and-comment regulation; an ever68 Fed. Reg. 50,428, 50,443 (proposed Aug. 20, 2003) (describing how pricing
proposals would save money for beneficiaries).
410
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2072 (2003)
(implementing prescription drug benefit as of January 1, 2006) (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a)(2)).
411
See Notice, Department of Health and Human Services, OIG
Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 65 Fed. Reg.
23,731 (May 5, 2003) (identifying risk areas for drug manufacturers).
412
See Notice, Department of Health and Human Services, OIG
Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,289
(Mar. 16, 2000) (identifying risk areas for the nursing home industry).
413
See Joan H. Krause, Medicare Error as False Claim, 27 AM. J. L. &
MED. 181 (2001) (discussing the potential applicability of the FCA to hospitals).
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increasing variety of informal guidance; and a combination of
private and public enforcement brought not simply against
providers who engage in “raw fraud,”414 but also against those who
act in accordance with defensible interpretations of ambiguous
laws and regulations. Yet experience suggests that this may not be
a feasible strategy for the industry in the long run. Instead, the
hallmark of an efficient anti-fraud strategy should be clarity: clear
rules to be followed by those who participate in the federal health
care programs, and clear penalties for those who stray.

414

James F. Blumstein, What Precisely is “Fraud” in the Health Care
Industry?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A25.

